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ABSTRACT:
A theoretical examination of the epistemological presuppositions of current educational practice is
presented and contrasted with the Genetic Epistemology of Jean Piaget. Piaget's theory holds that
the neophyte builds knowledge by subjecting previously established knowledge to an interaction
with the environment. New objects are assimilated to current knowledge structures and the
knowledge structures are accommodated to the objects. This proposition of Genetic Epistemology
constitutes a particular formulation of a more general method of knowledge construction through
an active process of hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing.
A survey of the history of technological development from primitive society to the beginnings of
modern chemistry and physics demonstrates that, in the absence of definite information, humans
have a propensity for generating hypothesis when faced with novel occurrences. These hypotheses
may be more or less fantastic in form. Modem day children exhibit a tendency to generate
explanations of natural events which reveal a tendency for animism. These explanations are initial
working hypotheses. The implications for education are two-fold. The neophyte approaches a novel
problem with a history of hypotheses generated in the absence of scientific explanation. These
constitute the subject's beliefs and prejudices. If these beliefs contradict the new information and
they are not addressed at their own level, they may hinder the learning process. The second
implication is that learning through hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing may be more
effective than the more traditional method of instruction which consists of a top down presentation
of material. This theme is further considered in the light of the scientific methodology. Karl
Popper's suggestion that science progresses through a process of conjecture and refutation
provides addition evidence for the central thesis. Another implication of this is that if scientists are
trained through hypothesis generation and testing, they receive implicit training on method.
Computers can be used to facilitate such a training method. Virtual laboratories, that are more or
less constrained, could be constructed to allow students to conduct experiments quickly, easily, and
safely. Simulation would facilitate the testing and elimination of hypotheses as necessary, and
knowledge structures could be built through a process of conjecture and refutation.
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Title: Associate Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering

4S7Z'/7Z~
6ca&t~~
4
Vactie ,,
5
,e143~p~ 7~
paaaruae Rdoe 60n,4 sraei4 5la Tad~ 7·
ea gdadaam~c
q&196a~i
6
I would like to thank Professor John Williams for giving me the freedom to find my
own way.
Special Thanks to Professor Jordan Peterson for all the maps.
Thanks to Seymour Papert for planting the seeds,
And to Ruaidhri O' Connor -- an endless source of encouragement.
*gRd Hag4
xat-d '494
7
8
Chapter 1: Learning Through Interaction ................................ 11
Chapter 2: Pre-Scientific Explanations ..................................... 35
Chapter 3: The Scientific Pursuit. . ............................... 57
Chapter 4: Computers and Education ....................................... 73
Epilogue ...................................................................................... 83
Bibliography ............................................................................... 85
9
10
Learning Through Interaction
"We ought, he says, to be neither like spiders, which spin things out of their own
insides, nor like ants, which merely collect, but like bees, which both collect and
arrange. This is somewhat unfair to the ants, but it illustrates Bacon's meaning."
- Bertrand Russell on Francis Bacon (History, p. 544).
Passive or active? Is the human's mind a simple reflection of the world, are we mere
glasses, or are we active explorers of our environment? This is the fundamental question
addressed by this thesis.
Are we the mirrors of reality, or as knowing subjects, do we order our experience of the
world? Does the old proverb we learn from experience presuppose that experience befalls
us, or that we chase it down and force experience to face our questions. Many assume it is
the former. Apart from ostensibly providing the most straightforward solution, there are
other reasons for harboring such a belief. The element of chance in our daily lives must
surely account for a portion of this belief. The idea that we might put experience to the
test of our opinions suggests that we have a measure of control over our experiences that
many would scarcely concede. The vastness of our ignorance provides another weighty
argument in favor of the proposition that the world simply makes its impression upon us.
"How," one might wonder, "could a person even begin to learn by posing questions to
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Nature. At what aspect of her vast multiplicity should the first question be addressed?"
One might well believe that it is first necessary to gain a modicum of knowledge in a new
domain before one may even guess at a reasonable question to ask. We could continue to
multiply justifications for the belief that we may best learn by watching and listening -- by
allowing the world to reveal its secrets to our waiting, quiet, our hungry, minds.
Neither is there a lack of evidence in support of the second view -- that the subject is an
active explorer. We learn by doing is a common idiom. To a large extent, our educational
system uses student exercises as a vital part of the learning process. Both the inquiries of
the student in the classroom and the apparent expectancies of the infant testify that,
though we may not know the answers in exact detail, we are not without opinions -- we
are not without expectancies -- we are not without questions.
The method of classroom teaching that is most prevalent today suggests that the former
view, that we are capable of simply absorbing information, holds sway. The classroom
situation consists of a top down presentation of observations and facts, theories and
explanations. Questions tend to be limited, and when posed, are typically answered by a
repetition of an idea or fact mentioned earlier. This may be due to a more or less tacit
agreement among educators that assailing a mind with a barrage of information is the most
effective method of imparting knowledge. On the other hand, it may simply provide the
easiest solution to a difficult problem. Classrooms are large, and teaching staff is limited.
Each individual student brings to the task his own personal history -- a (mental) history
that, for the most part, is inaccessible to the educator. By resorting to a top down
presentation of material, the teacher aims at efficient communication. The current
classroom approach may constitute an attempt to provide as much information to as many
individuals as possible. However, if the learner is not simply a sponge, then this method
may be significantly sub-optimal.
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In the main, this inquiry addresses this question. Chapter one introduces the
epistemological argument. John Locke provides us with a suitable background for our
discussion. As a proponent of the idea that we come into the world completely void of
knowledge, and that we learn entirely from experience, he represents the empiricists' view,
the view that one's mind, one's knowledge, is the passive reflection of the world. Against
this, we raise the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant whose epistemology
appears diametrically opposed to Locke's. Our main concern with these philosophers is
two-fold. Firstly, their ideas introduce the problem of human knowledge and the early
attempts at its solution. Secondly, they provide us with a vantage point from which we
may consider the epistemology of Jean Piaget.
While studying the origins of knowledge in children, Jean Piaget expounded the idea that
we build our knowledge of the world through active participation. The knowledge
structures we already possess go out to meet novel situations. In the process, they are
modified, typically toward the end of becoming more appropriate structures for further
interaction with that situation. He considered this to be a reciprocal process of assimilation
and accommodation. Newly encountered objects are assimilated to a knowledge structure
and the structure is modified by it. Assimilation and accommodation may be viewed as a
process of hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing. When a subject attempts to
assimilate an object to a knowledge structure, he hypothesizes that the object will be
amenable to manipulation by that knowledge structure. When the knowledge structure is
applied to an object, the structure itself is modified. This constitutes a test of the
hypothesis. The proposition that humans explore unknown domains through a process of
hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing is explored in the following two chapters.
Chapter two is a historical survey of the propensity of humans to generate hypotheses in
the face of the unknown. Our points of departure are Primitive Man, Europeans of the
renaissance period, and modern European children. It is interesting that whenever there is
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a need for explanation or for action, there is a hypothesis. It is also interesting that these
hypotheses are often quite fantastic in form. The implications of this for learning seem to
be two-fold. Firstly, if a human has an instinct to generate hypotheses when faced with a
novel situation, then these hypotheses should be explicitly addressed -- that is, put to an
earlier, rather than later, test. Secondly, the mechanism of building knowledge through
hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing may be substantially more powerful that we
currently suspect. It may be time to consider these possibilities seriously.
The methods of science are considered in the third chapter. Here we find the most explicit
formulation of our central thesis. In his study on the logic of scientific discovery, Karl
Popper realized that science itself advances through a process of conjecture and refutation.
The researcher develops a hypothesis -- a theory, and then makes a genuine attempt to
refute it. If these are the ways of science, then by adapting similar methods in our
educational system, we may also benefit by providing our future scientist with implicit
training in method. The potential is yet to be explored.
In the light of these considerations, the final chapter considers a potential role for the use
of computers in education. As virtual laboratories, which may be programmed to any level
of order and constraint, they may provide us with the versatility necessary to make such an
approach to education possible. We also consider the appropriateness of the methods
suggested here for various aspects of education. It is obvious that the value of these
methods may be limited. This is considered in more detail in the final chapter.
Now, let us consider the problem as it was addressed by some of the greatest philosophers
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Following this we will examine a twentieth
century response to their solutions.
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The Philosophical Ground of Modern Epistemology
Introduction
Broadly speaking, modern epistemology may be said to derive from two schools of
thought, viz. empiricism and apriorism. John Locke may be considered the father of
empiricism (Russell, History, p. 609), though he had predecessors in Francis Bacon and
Hobbes. His epistemology holds that all our knowledge must ultimately derive from
experience. In extending Locke's ideas, David Hume dealt his critical blow to the logical
validity of scientific induction. This spurred Immanuel Kant, educated in the rationalist
tradition (Russell, Problems, p. 83), to attempt (in the face of Hume's skepticism) to
answer such questions as: "How is pure mathematics possible?"; and "How is pure natural
science possible?" (Kant, Prolegomena, p. 24). The result of his inquiry was the epoch
making Critique of Pure Reason, wherein he states that the intuitions of space and time
are given to us a priori, along with categories of judgment, such as causality.
Rather than providing us with definitive conclusions, a cursory glance at these two
epistemologies will serve us as an orientation for considering the more modern
approaches to learning and knowledge, specifically, the genetic epistemology of Jean
Piaget.
John Locke (1632-1704)
John Locke was an empiricist -- he believed that all human knowledge ultimately derives
from sense-perception and introspection. In 1690 he published the first edition of his
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, wherein he hoped to determine 'what objects
our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with' (Locke, quoted from Copleston,
History Vol. 5, p. 69).
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The intellectual climate of the time was heavily influenced by the rationalist Rene
Descartes. Descartes, after applying his method of systematic doubt to everything one may
possibly doubt, arrived at the indubitable truth: "I think therefore I am"; and its correlate
(Rene Descartes, quoted from Flanagan, p. 11):
"But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a
thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which
also imagines and feels."
These functions of the mind are given before experience -- they are inborn -- and they
constitute the ultimate source of our knowledge. Experience merely occasions the
generation of knowledge by these processes (Gardner, History, p. 52). Thus, the mind
plays an active role in the formation and organization of our knowledge, and the nature of
this role is determined a priori, that is, before and independent of all experience.
Locke begins his Essay by rejecting the thesis of innate ideas. He suggests that the
argument in its favor, that there are principles upon which all people agree, is both
incorrect, and even if correct, would not necessitate the existence of innate ideas
(Copleston, History Vol. 5, p. 74). His position is best captured by (Locke, quoted from
Herrnstein and Boring, History, p. 584):
"Let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all
Characters, without any Ideas; How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by
that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with
an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and
Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from Experience: In that, all our
Knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself."
Thus the mind as tabula rasa. The experience Locke refers to is our experience of the
external world, as given to us by our senses, and our experience of the operations of the
mind itself, as given to us by reflection. Of the latter, the mind derives its ideas of
"Perception, Thinking, Doubting, Believing, Reasoning, Knowing, Willing, and all the
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different actings of our own minds" (ibid., p. 585) through observation of the mind as it
operates upon its ideas. That is to say, these ideas are derived from observing the mind
perceive, think, doubt, etc., not that these processes are derived from experience. Thus the
epistemology of Locke allows for mental processes given a priori.
It may be worthwhile to consider the differences between the positions of Locke and
Descartes more explicitly. Both allow for innate processes. However, for Descartes,
knowledge has its ultimate source in the mind, while for Locke, knowledge has it ultimate
source in experience. So, for example, Descartes' mind will generate the idea of parallel
lines when occasioned by its own thinking or experiencing, while Locke's mind will
abstract the idea of parallel lines from repeated experience of such lines as they are given
to our senses.
For Locke, experience is the source of our ideas. But what of the ideas themselves? Locke
made the distinction between what he called simple ideas and complex ideas. Of simple
ideas he distinguished four classes: ideas of one sense (whiteness: vision); simple ideas of
more than one sense (figure: vision and feeling (physical)); simple ideas of reflection
(thinking); and simple ideas derived through reflection and sensation (pleasure, pain)
(Copleston, History Vol. 5, p. 79). These ideas are passively perceived through sensation
and reflection, and percpetion is "the first step and degree towards knowledge, and the
inlet of all the material in it" (Locke, quoted from Russell, History, p. 610). "It is not in
the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety
of thought, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways
aforementioned." (Locke, quoted from Copleston, History Vol. 5, p. 80).
Complex ideas are actively framed by the mind through operations performed on a number
of simple or simple and complex ideas. Locke spelled out three classes of operation:
combination; relation (comparing without combining); and abstraction (separating one
idea from the other ideas which accompany it in their real existence). The complex ideas
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which may be formed through such operations may be modes, substances, or relations.
Modes are complex ideas which depend upon, or affect substances. Drunkenness and
hypocrisy are examples of such ideas.
"[The general idea of substance is] nothing but the supposed but unknown support
of those [clusters of simple ideas which] we find existing, which we imagine cannot
subsist sine re substante, without something to support them." (Locke, quoted
from Copleston, History Vol. 5, p. 91)
The mind itself supplies the idea of a substrate, which it presupposes on encountering
recurring clusters of simple ideas. Finally, a relation is a complex ideas derived from the
operation of relating two ideas. An example of a relational idea is cause, as is its
concomitant effect. The relational idea we call cause derives from observing how one idea,
e.g. liquid, may be brought into existence by another idea, e.g. the application of heat to
ice. Here the heat is considered in relation to the transformation of ice to water, and is
considered the cause, while the appearance of the liquid is considered the effect.
While too meager in detail to allow us to consider Locke's epistemology on its own terms,
the preceding exposition will provide us with an introduction to the associationist
empiricist's approach to knowledge. Simple ideas are received passively, and exclusively,
by the mind through perception (sensation and reflection), while complex ideas are
actively constructed by the mind through operations performed on other ideas. All
complex ideas ultimately derive from simple ideas, and therefore from experience.
"Knowledge," according to Locke, "is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of
two ideas" (Locke, quoted in Russell, History, p. 611). Thus, all knowledge ultimately
derives from experience.
Locke's ideas were later picked up and expanded by George Berkeley and David Hume.
The result of this extension was radical skepticism -- a position that greatly undermined
the authority of any human knowledge. As we shall see later, Hume limited the possibility
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of knowledge with certainty to the area of mathematics. This threat to the possibility of
real scientific knowledge lead Immanuel Kant to a critical examination of human reason,
and an attempt to separate what we can know from what we cannot. The product of his
inquiry was The Critique of Pure Reason, one of the most influential books in philosophy.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
Before considering the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, it will be expedient to consider the
problems to which his efforts were addressed. In particular, it was David Hume's
argument against the necessity of a connection between the events which we typically call
cause and effect (Kant, Prolegomena, p. 5). It was this, coupled with a firm conviction in
the necessary validity of Newtonian Mechanics and Euclidean Geometry, that inspired him
to build the philosophical monument he offers us in his Critique of Pure Reason.
David Hume
David Hume (1711-1776) was an empiricist in the tradition of John Locke and George
Berkeley. Hume, however, distinguished himself from Locke and Berkeley in that he did
not shrink, but pushed his philosophy to its logical conclusion. In the opinion of Bertrand
Russell, the result was self-consistent, but incredible, and something of a philosophical
dead end (Russell, History, p. 659). Be that as it may, he made explicit many of the tacit
consequences of empiricism, severely undermined the metaphysical notion of causality,
and demonstrated, with clarity and simplicity, that the certainty of the results obtained by
employing induction could not be supported logically.
The contents of the mind Hume calls perceptions, and these he divides into two classes:
impressions and ideas. By impressions he means immediate sensation, and by ideas,
thoughts in general (Hume, Inquiry, p. 27). In this theory the notion of the association of
is central: ideas tend to call up one another with a certain degree of regularity (ibid., p.
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31). His system holds that there are only three principles of association: resemblance,
contiguity, and causation.
Hume felt that the objects of human reason were of two kinds: relations of ideas and
matters of fact. Geometry, algebra, arithmetic, and every relation which is intuitively or
demonstratively certain are of the first kind. These relations are objects of pure thought,
and rely only upon the ideas they connect. They require nothing outside of the mind for
their confirmation (ibid., p. 40).
Matters of fact, on the other hand, rely solely upon the testimony of our senses and
memory, and therefore do not attain certainty after the manner of relations of ideas. Hume
argues that "all reasoning concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of
cause and effect" (ibid., p. 41). Because the mind experiences the constant conjunction of
event A (called cause) and event B (called effect), it assumes a necessary connection
(causality). However, the belief that in the future experience of A will continue to be
conjoined with experience of B presupposes that the future will resemble the past. This
requires that nature be uniform. But the uniformity of nature is not a logical necessity.
Therefore, the notion that the past will resemble the future -- expedient as it may be -- is
not a logical necessity.
That nature is not uniform means that all knowledge which depends upon experience for
its validation, is not certain, but only probabilistic. Also, causality, as it is known to the
understanding, is not a necessary connection between events, but merely a belief founded
upon the past experience of the constant conjunction of events. The belief in the necessary
connection between 'cause' and 'effect' is merely due to custom, it is a habit (ibid., p.56).
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Kant's Answer
Hume's skepticism insists that we have no evidence of a necessary connection between
events we call causes and events we call effects. Thus, causality is merely a supposition
formed through habit. Since the thesis that nature is uniform cannot be logically
supported, knowledge derived solely through induction is not apodictic. Consequently the
laws of nature cannot be known with absolute certainty.
Mathematics escaped Hume's skepticism because, according to Hume, mathematical
propositions are analytic. That is, the predicate contains no more information than is
already contained in the subject. "A square is a figure with four equal sides," is an analytic
judgment -- "four equal sides" is already contained in the concept of "square". In a
synthetic proposition on the other hand, the predicate amplifies the subject. "The color of
the table is brown," is a synthetic proposition -- browness is not already contained in the
concept called "table." Hume maintains that all synthetic judgments rely entirely upon
experience for their confirmation. All physics and metaphysics require synthetic judgments
which rely upon experience. Consequently they cannot be known with certainty. Thus,
physics and metaphysics are not apodictic sciences, as mathematics is.
Kant was not of Hume's opinion that mathematical propositions are analytic. In the
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics he gives an example from geometry. "That a
straight line is the shortest path between two points is a synthetic proposition. For my
concept of straight contains nothing of quantity, but only a quality" (Kant, Prolegomena,
p. 14). Since mathematical propositions are synthetic', and are given a priori (independent
Bertrand Russell states (History, p. 716): "The transcendental (or epistemological) argument is best
stated in the Prolegomena. Geometry, as we now know, is a name governing two different studies. On the
one hand, there is pure geometry, which deduces consequences from axioms, without inquiring whether
the axioms are "true"; this contains nothing which does not follow from logic, and is not "synthetic," and
has no need of figures such as are used in geometrical text-books. On the other hand, there is geometry as
a branch of physics, as it appears, for example, in the general theory of relativity; this is an empirical
science, in which the axioms are inferred from measurements, and are found to differ from Euclid's. Thus
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of experience), then synthetic propositions a priori are possible. Kant then poses the
question: "How are synthetic propositions a priori possible" (ibid., p. 21).
The first part of this main transcendental question is "How is pure mathematics possible"
(ibid., p. 25). In answering this question, Kant makes the distinction between what he calls
the noumenal world and the phenomenal world. The thing-in-itself exists in the noumenal
world. Our experience of the thing-in-itself is phenomenal. Kant claims that we have no
access to the noumenal world, except as it presents itself to us in experience. Thus we can
only know the reflection of a thing in the phenomenal world, we can never know the
thing-in-itself.
The objects of experience (phenomena) are arranged according to the intuitions of space
and time. "Intuition" is the common translation of Kant's German "anschauung," which
literally means "looking at" or "view" (Russell, History, p. 708). So for Kant, space and
time are not concepts. Rather, they are the forms of intuition, and all experience is
arranged according to these forms. Now, since our only experience of the external world
is through the intuitions of space and time, the question: "How are the synthetic
propositions of geometry a priori possible?," has a straight-forward answer. Geometry
completely describes the intuition of space -- thus all the objects of experience must, a
priori, obey the rules of geometry. We cannot know whether of not the propositions of
geometry apply to the noumenal world, but we can know that all objects of experience
(phenomena) must conform to these propositions -- and this we know with certainty.
Despite Hume's refutation of the possibility of apodictic propositions derived from
experience, Kant believed that Nature was necessarily ruled by the laws of physics (Kant,
Prolegomena., p. 38):
of the two kinds of geometry one is a priori but not synthetic, while the other is synthetic but not a priori.
This disposes of the transcendental argument."
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"We nonetheless actually posses a pure natural science in which are propounded, a
priori, and with all the necessity requisite to apodictic propositions, laws to which
nature is subject"
So the second part of Kant's main transcendental question is "How is pure natural science
possible?" (ibid., p. 38). Kant asks whether judgments of experience may be given a
priori? To this he answers in the affirmative. How is this possible? The objects of
experience, as presented to the understanding through the intuitions (anschauung) of
space and time, are all subsumed under the concepts of the understanding -- "concepts
which have their origin quite a priori in the pure understanding, and under which every
perception must first of all be subsumed and then by their means changed into experience"
(ibid., p. 41). There are 12 concepts of pure understanding, of which causality is one
example. Hume maintains that causality is merely the name given to an expectation that
may be attributed to habit. Kant replies that causality is a precondition of all experience.
Hume claims that the proposition 'for every effect there is a cause" cannot be apodictic,
because the proposition is derived from experience. Kant answers that the proposition is
indeed apodictic, and given a priori, because all experience is subsumed under the
concepts of the understanding -- i.e. the proposition 'for every effect there is a cause" is a
precondition of experience itself.
The third part of the main transcendental question, as addressed in the Prolegomena,
concerns the possibility of metaphysics as a science. Since our primary concern with Kant
is epistemological, his discussion on metaphysics is not immediately relevant to the current
discussion. The main idea I wish to draw from Kant's philosophy is that all experience is
ordered according to the forms of intuition and the concepts of the understanding, and
these are given a priori. In other words, experience is not the passive reflection of the
world in the mind, it is the result of the mind's active ordering of the objects of
experience; and this ordering proceeds according to rules which are not derived from
experience, but are preconditions of experience itself. By way of analogy, Bertrand Russell
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suggests that "if you always wore blue spectacles, you could be sure of seeing everything
blue" (Russell, History, p. 707). Kant's solution to Hume's skepticism could be stated
thus: the laws of physics and mathematics describe the spectacles -- consequently they will
always hold true.
Empiricism and Apriorism
In attempting to answer the empiricist's threat to the possibility of human knowledge,
Kant's philosophy states that the nature of our experience of the world is determined prior
to experience. In this way it hopes to demonstrate that all of our experience of nature
must, of necessity, conform to laws which are given a priori. A position quite removed
from that of John Locke. Simply stated these two traditions are as follows: that all
experience is fully determined by the active workings of our mind -- the laws of which are
given a priori; vis a vis that the contents of our minds are a passive reflection of the
external world, i.e., a posteriori. These set the stage for Jean Piaget, who, due to his
developmental observations of children, concluded that the human subject is neither the
passive mirror of the world, nor does he completely determine the nature of all experience
a priori, but rather meets the external world half-way, and constructs his knowledge of it
out of the interaction between his knowledge and the external world.
Jean Piaget (1896-1980): Genetic Epistemology
Jean Piaget's Genetic Epistemology constitutes an attempt both to determine the ultimate
origins of knowledge, and to trace and explain its development from these origins to later
levels of knowledge, including scientific knowledge (Piaget, Principles, p. 15). Since
knowledge, personal or scientific, is not a static affair -- on the contrary it is in a state of
continual flux -- the correct path to understanding the nature of knowledge is not through
the observation of its manifestation at a particular instant, but rather through the
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consideration of its development. He approached this problem by studying the mental
development of children.
The Stages of Development and Knowledge Structures
Piaget believed that the child goes through definite stages of development. Each stage
constitutes an advance over the previous stages and contains knowledge structures that
are new to the stage. The child also possesses knowledge structures of all previous stages,
though these may have been modified through the addition of new characteristics (Piaget,
Studies, p. 6). He distinguished six stages of development: the reflex stage, the stage of
first motor habits, the sensori-motor stage, the stage of intuitive intelligence, the stage of
concrete intellectual operations, and finally, the stage of abstract intellectual operations.
The specific details of each stage are of less interest to us than the process of advancement
from one stage to the next.
Piaget held that the individual's knowledge is captured in what he calls knowledge
structures. The child constructs these through a process of interaction with the
environment. The different stages of development are marked off from one another by the
level of sophistication of the knowledge structures new to that stage. So, for instance, the
sensori-motor stage is characterized by knowledge structures consisting of actions and
perceptions. The stage of concrete intellectual operation on the other hand, is
characterized by knowledge structures capable of assimilating and performing intellectual
operations, which by definition are reversible, on problems of a concrete nature. Learning
is a process of extending current structures, or constructing new ones, through a process
of modification and combination of pre-existing structures.
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Functional Invariants: Assimilation and Accommodation
An important component of Piaget's theory is the existence of functional invariants across
all stages of development (Piaget, Studies, p. 4). Assimilation and accommodation
constitute a complementary pair of such functional invariants. A child continually
assimilates objects to his actions. For example, a child may have learned a pattern of
behaviors, i.e., an action schema2, for opening drawers in a cabinet. Over the course of the
child's exploration he will come into contact with new objects, for example a closet door.
The child will attempt to apply the action schema for drawers to the closet door -- that is,
he will try to open the closet door using the sequence of motor actions he typically
employs in opening drawers. In Piaget's terms, the closet door is assimilated to the action
schema. Since opening a closet door requires slightly different actions than opening a
drawer, the action schema accommodates itself to the closet door, and is modified in the
process. Thus, a new object is assimilated to existing action schema, and in the process of
the child's interaction with the object, the action schema itself is modified, i.e., it
accommodates the object, making the schema more fit for interaction with the object in
the future.
The Mental Development of the Child
What follows is a brief summary of the early cognitive development of the child. This will
be useful for two reasons. In the first place, it will provide us with a more stable
understanding of the idea of constructing knowledge through interaction with the
environment. In the second, it will help place Piaget's ideas in better relation to those of
Locke and Kant, and help underscore the implication of these ideas for education.
2 Piaget defines action schemas as "coordinated systems of movements and perceptions, which constitute
any elementary behavior capable of being repeated and applied to new situations, e.g., grasping, moving,
shaking an object" (Piaget, Play, p. 274).
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Sensori-Motor Intelligence
The first 18 to 24 months of the life of the child, the pre-linguistic period, consists of three
progressive stages. The first is the reflex stage. This is followed by the stage of circular
reactions, or habits. Finally the infant reaches the stage of sensori-motor, or practical
intelligence. Through use, the initially weak reflexes of the child become strengthened. As
each reflex encounters a new object, the object is assimilated to the reflex. This period of
assimilation of objects to the reflexes is followed by a period of circular reactions. As the
child takes more interest in the consequences of his actions, he repeats them. But each
repetition is not merely identical to the preceding one, it is a variation on it, or an
experiment. This constitutes a more advanced form of assimilation. The pre-linguistic
stages of development culminate in the stage of sensori-motor intelligence. "It is an
entirely practical intelligence based on the manipulations of objects." It allows for
exploration and problem solving in the physical environment (Piaget, Studies, p. 11).
The knowledge structures of sensori-motor intelligence are formed primarily through a
process of assimilation. In his interactions with the environment, the child is constantly
involved in an "organizing activity" (Piaget, Psychology, p. 5). Unlike the associationist's
view, which holds that over this time the child learns associations between objects that
exist in the environment and its own actions, Piaget's view holds that the objects are
assimilated to action schema -- that is, objects are known through the actions performed
on them3 -- and over the course of this assimilation, the action schemas themselves are
modified (accommodation). Thus, the subject actively organizes its experience of objects,
which in turn affect this organizing activity. It is a reciprocal relationship -- assimilation of
reality to the subject, and accommodation of the subject to reality.
3 "At five or six years children still define concepts by starting with the words, 'It is for': a table 'is for
writing on,' etc." (Piaget, Studies, p. 12).
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The Construction of Reality
The child begins life and passes its first 1.5 to 2 years without a sense of self, and
consequently experiences the world as an undifferentiated continuum with its body as the
(unconscious) center and reference for all events (Piaget, Principles, p. 21). During this
period of radical egocentricism, experience is undifferentiated -- it lacks the categories of
object, space, causality and time -- the categories under which the older child orders his
experience.
This changes over the course of the second year. Through a process of reciprocal
assimilation, action schemas become assimilated, one to the other -- in other words,
actions become coordinated (Piaget, Studies, p. 12). These coordinated actions lead to
(coordinated) displacements of objects in the external environment - allowing the child to
experience objects in spatio-temporal relation to itself and to one another. Through this
interaction, the permanence of objects and the existence of causal relations are recognized
and incorporated into the action schemas of the child -- the child begins to experience
itself as an active agent which is differentiated from other objects in a physical
environment (Piaget, Principles, pp. 21-22).
Up until this time the child experiences space across the modalities of sensation, that is, it
experiences a visual space, a tactile space, etc. With the coordination of actions, these
spaces are experienced in concert and the child acquires a sense of general space.
Coordinated actions and the concomitant displacements of objects result in the recognition
of object permanence. This, in turn, is also tightly linked to acquisition of a sense of
causality and temporal sequence (Piaget, Studies, pp. 13-15).
It should be noted that Piaget is not suggesting that the child has a conscious conception
of object, causality, space, and time: rather these notions are assimilated to the child's
action schemas -- i.e. the child now behaves as one with a sense of causality, object
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permanence, etc. The child constructs reality by incorporating aspects of it into his
actions. It is a sensori-motor conception of the external world. Piaget believed that these
action schemas later act as the basis for more abstract representations of these notions. To
compare this view to that of John Locke, the child does not passively experience space
and time, rather he incorporates spatio-temporal relations into his actions. Against the
Kantian view, genetic epistemology holds that the child does not experience objects as
they present themselves to the pre-formed intuitions of space and time but rather builds
spatial-temporal relations into its behavior through a reciprocal process of assimilation of
reality to action schemas and accommodation of these schemas to reality.
The Semiotic Function
Over the first two years of life the intelligence of the child is limited to the sensori motor
level, i.e., through assimilation of objects to actions, and reciprocal accommodation of
these actions to the objects, the child has constructed actions schemas which allow him to
solve practical problems. Despite this, the child is not capable of representation (i.e.
mental imagery), and all aspects of the problem must exist in the child's sensory field
before an action schema may be applied. Towards the end of the second year (Piaget,
Psychology, p. 51), the semiotic function, the ability to use signs to signify something,
begins to make its appearance.
Representation is achieved through a process of imitation. Piaget believed that rather than
being a specifically hereditary characteristic, the process of imitation is functionally
contiguous with the modes of adaptation characteristic of the sensori-motor stage.
Imitation is merely a "primacy of accommodation over assimilation" (Piaget, Play, p. 5).
For example, imitating a model involves accommodating action schemas to the model
(modifying them) so that the action schemas copy or represent the model (semiosis). The
model is not assimilated to an action schema, i.e., subsumed as an object well suited for
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manipulation by the action schema. Consequently imitation is a primacy of accommodation
over assimilation.
By the end of the sensori-motor period the child's skills of imitation reach a level whereby
deferred imitation becomes possible -- the child is capable of imitating the model when the
model is no longer in the child's perceptual field. This is the beginnings of representation.
The actions of the imitation signify the actions of the original model. Piaget provides an
example (Piaget, Psychology, p. 53):
"But in the case of a little girl of sixteen months who sees a playmate become
angry, scream, and stamp her foot (new sights for her) and who, an hour or two
after the playmate's departure, imitates the scene, laughing, the deferred imitation
constitutes the beginning of representation, and the imitative gesture the beginning
of a differentiated signifier."
The semiotic function, which becomes truly representational with the advent of differed
imitation, eventually leads to mental representation, or mental imagery. First there is a
period of symbolic play. Imitative actions performed on objects allow objects to be used
as symbols for other objects, or people. The process of symbolic play allows the child to
symbolically explore various situations -- as for example, when children play house.
Another progression towards mental representation occurs when the child begins to draw
(two to two and a half years). Piaget believed that the beginning of the drawing activity
was a point halfway between symbolic play and mental representation (Piaget,
Psychology, p.63). Drawing represents an imitative act, the early goal of which is to
produce a graphical copy of real models. Eventually the stage of mental representation, "a
kind of interiorized imitation" (Piaget, Play, p. 5) is achieved. This constitutes a
considerable advance over differed imitation, and symbolic play, in that exploration is
possible without the necessity of physical imitation.
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Language appears at approximately the same time as the other forms of the semiotic
function (Piaget, Psychology, p. 84). Individual words are acquired through imitation of
phonemes, at first allowing children to utter one word sentences, then two, etc. Grammar
appears later. The appearance of language constitutes a tremendous advance for mental
representation -- language brings with it an array of signifiers which, besides facilitating
representation and allowing thought to extend to remote situation, are shared by the
community. This allows for the sharing of experience and validation of ideas by the group.
Conclusion
As we have seen, Piaget believed that an individual's knowledge is captured in knowledge
structures, and that these are generated by the individual's activities. This generating
activity is a functional invariant, that is, it functions at all stages of development, and it is
responsible for the generation and integration of all new knowledge. The functional
invariant is a reciprocal process of assimilation and accommodation. New objects, or
ideas, are assimilated to existing knowledge structures, and the knowledge structures are
accommodated to the new objects. According to Piaget, this principle seems to hold true
at all levels of learning.
At the sensori-motor level, the period before language acquisition, knowledge structures
consist of action schemas. As new objects are encountered, the child attempts to assimilate
the new object to an existing action schema. This is a classification activity. Objects are
classified under the particular action schema if they are amenable to assimilation. If not,
the child will attempt to assimilate the object to another action schema, or attempt to
classify it to a different group of objects. Earlier we remarked that for the child, objects
are known through the actions performed on them. If an object can be assimilated to a
particular action schema, the action schema is correspondingly accommodated to, or
modified by, the object.
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Each initial attempt at assimilation represents and experiment. The child attempts to
manipulate an object using a particular action schema. The result of the experiment is
either a failure to assimilate the object, or assimilation accompanied by accommodation.
Even at later stages of development, learning continues as such a process of
experimentation. For example, we can consider more abstract levels of problem solving.
When a novel idea is encountered, and the individual is required to interact with the idea,
there is an initial stage where the individual actively attempts to classify the new idea
according to the pre-existing knowledge structures. This is an initial attempt at
assimilation. It is an experimental process. If the problem seems amenable to a particular
knowledge structure, there will be an attempt at full assimilation, followed by
accommodation. If not, a new experiment is begun.
Finally we can briefly consider how these views differ from those of Locke and Kant.
Kant's work was primarily an attempt to rescue science from the relative uncertainty of
inductive logic. Piaget's researches were deeply influenced by Kant's ideas. Primarily his
experiments demonstrated that the intuitions of space and time, and the categories of the
understanding, causality for example, were not a priori and necessary preconditions for all
experience. In fact, Piaget demonstrated that the child constructs these categories of
organization, and moreover, the child does so quite late in his development. His views also
differ substantially from those of Locke. While Locke believed that the subject passively
mirrors the objects of his environment, Piaget thought that objects are known to the
subject in terms of the actions (physical, mental) he can successfully perform on them. The
subject is active. He constructs his knowledge of an object or idea through a process of
experimentation.
This theme is further explored in the following pages. Chapter two represents an attempt
to demonstrate that humans naturally approach a novel problem with an initial set of
working hypotheses, which may either help a person to a final solution, or hinder him, by
leading him into error. Chapter three examines the growth of science as a process of
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conjecture and refutation, a view expounded by Karl Popper. The intention is to
demonstrate that scientific knowledge and human knowledge both progress after the same
fashion of hypothesis generation (attempt at assimilation) and hypothesis testing
(accommodation). The final chapter attempts to draw together the main threads of the
argument, and based on these principles it suggests a role for the use of computers in
education.
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Pre-Scientific Explanations
"[An Old man] came from the South, traveling north, making animals and birds as
he passed along. He made the mountains, prairies, timber, and brush first. So he
went along, traveling northward, making things as he went, putting rivers here and
there, and falls on them, putting red paint here and there in the ground -- fixing up
the world as we see it to-day. He made the Milk River (the Teton) and crossed it,
and being tired, went up on a hill and lay down to rest. As he lay on his back,
stretched out on the ground, with arms extended, he marked himself out with
stones -- the shape of his body, head, legs, arms, and everything. There you can
see those rocks today."
Introduction
The preceding creation myth of the Blackfeet of Montana (Campbell, Hero, pp. 289-290)
is just one example of the attempts to answer one of the great questions of mankind --
"How did it all begin?" Mythological answers like this one may serve a number of
purposes. One obvious one is that it provides the individual with a working hypothesis,
that is, an initial set of assumptions about the nature of the world -- assumptions that allow
him to move functionally in his environment.
Humans are limited in both space and time. Consequently the individual must live with an
imperfect knowledge of both himself and his environment. It is a hostile environment --
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any action or inaction has consequences which may be fatal to the individual. In his book
The Gods of War, Jordan Peterson notes that:
"It is the totality of human experience, known and unknown, ordered and chaotic,
that demands behavioral adaptation. The absence of specific depiction, under
inexplicable circumstances, does not alleviate the necessity of appropriate action --
even though the specific nature of that action cannot yet be specified."
In other words, when faced with a relatively novel situation, despite his imperfect
knowledge, the individual is still required to act -- to fail to do so would be fatal.
However, what actions are appropriate in the face of something never before experienced.
Novel situations must be worked through by a process of trial and error. An initial
hypothesis must be generated. Without this, action would be impossible. Once generated,
this hypothesis may be tested through the application of actions appropriate to it. Such a
reaction, hypothesis generation in the face of the unknown, is instinctive, and evolved over
the phylogenetic history of man.
When a student approaches a new problem domain, he does not approach it as a blank
tablet. He brings with him a set of assumptions which are typically unknown and
inaccessible to his instructor. When the student begins to work in the domain, he possesses
only a limited knowledge of its nature. Whenever necessary, the student will use his
imagination to generate models of the dark and gray aspects of the problem -- aspects for
which he has not yet received explicit instruction. This is the natural and necessary
reaction, and it is this reaction that prevents the student from merely acting like a sponge,
and accepting the instructors 'facts' as they are thrown at him.
The hypotheses generated in the face of the unknown are imaginative -- they are the
products of fantasy. While the main themes can be surprisingly common across
individuals, the details are private (autistic), and consequently inaccessible to the instructor
and other students. Without addressing these tacit assumptions (autistic fantasies) the
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instructor may be fighting a loosing battle. Often the instructor must resort to repeating
facts until the student learns them either by rote or as patterns. The student can later
demonstrate this knowledge through a process of pattern matching -- often leaving the
understanding out of the issue completely. Since they are unchallenged at their own level,
the initial assumptions are left in place. These assumptions may later become manifest as
error when the pattern recognition procedures prove inadequate. Apart from the
occasional occurrence of error, these seemingly obdurate assumptions may also function
as impediments to further learning.
It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the reality and nature of this instinct to
hypothesis generation. A number of pre-scientific domains are considered. The first, the
attitudes and beliefs of so-called primitive peoples allow us to consider a realm where
hypothesis generation in the face of the unknown is necessary for survival. It is a mode of
thought that seems most alien and arbitrary to us, and yet proves functional for the well-
being of these peoples. The second, early science, will also prove instructive, particularly
that precursor to chemistry: Alchemy. Over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries the magico-religious father of modern chemistry fell into tremendous disrepute.
Alchemy was cursed as an impediment to real science -- a necessary reaction, required for
the protection of the empirical methodology, still in the process of finding its roots. Once
established, the empirical methodology was itself turned upon the problem of alchemy.
From this vantage point it is easier to see alchemy, not only as the precursor of chemistry,
but also as a necessary precondition for its genesis. Finally our attention turns towards the
children of own era, specifically to their explanations of natural phenomena, as gathered
by the eminent psychologist and epistemologist, Jean Piaget.
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Primitive Man and his Conception of the World
In his paper Archaic Man, Carl Jung discusses his encounters with some primitive tribes in
Africa. Over the course of the essay, his position becomes quite clear: archaic man is like
modern man, only in some respects -- more so; while in others -- less so. The essential
difference between primitive man and modern man, according to Jung, is that the modern
has a more differentiated consciousness. In other words, the modern is less likely than the
primitive to attribute his emotional state in the presence of an object to the object itself, as
an intrinsic property of the object. The modern will tend to recognize his feelings of
uneasiness while walking through the woods at night as being a somewhat irrational, even
childish, fear. On the other hand the primitive will know, with certainty, that the woods at
night are populated by demons and specters. Anyone imagining that modern day western
man is over such superstitious nonsense should take a moment to inquire of the older
gentleman, accustomed as he is to walking the night time rural byways of the South West
of Ireland, on the reality of the Banshee.4 Jung describes the attribution of phenomena of
internal origin (emotional response) to external causes, projection. The difference between
primitive man and modern man is the extent to which he projects his own fears and desires
on to the objects of his environment.
Issues discussed by Jung in his essay on archaic man which are of immediate concern for
us here are those of causality, determinism and chance. Jung provides a hypothetical
example (Jung, Archaic, p. 56) of a relatively unusual event in the lives of a primitive
community. Three women go to the river to fetch water. During the process, one of the
women is seized by a crocodile and pulled under. While crocodiles are somewhat timid
animals, and do not often attack humans, they have been know to do so on occasion. The
questions remaining are these: 'why did the crocodile attack?' and 'why did he choose that
particular woman?' An explorer from western Europe would be inclined to simply shrug at
4 A Banshee is a female spirit of Gaelic folklore who's scream may be heard in the middle of the night,
announcing the upcoming death of a family member.
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the matter and weakly mutter: "bad luck, I suppose." The primitive, rigidly adhering to his
need for deterministic order in the world, would find such an explanation superficial, and
unsatisfactory. He would eventually settle on a deterministic explanation, often one of
malicious intent. For example, it may be thought that the medicine man of a neighboring
tribe simply used the crocodile as an instrument of murder. The crocodile did not attack
the woman by chance, rather he carried out the instructions of the medicine man who
wished this particular woman killed. Chance, to the primitive mind, is an absurd
superstition of the European explorer.
it is interesting that, despite the entire endeavor of science to causally explain the manifold
of nature, the primitive view of the world is more deterministic than the modern one.
Chance, however, is not superstitious, as the primitive may suppose. It has been
formalized in probability theory, and even forms the basis for quantum mechanics. Despite
this, probability theory remains one of the most difficult areas of study for the student. It is
notoriously counter intuitive. Take for example the oft-cited Monty Hall problem. There
are three doors, behind each of two stands a goat, behind the third awaits a car. The
player's goal is to guess which door stands before the car. The player chooses a door.
Monty opens one of the other two, reveals a goat, and gives the player the opportunity to
change his mind. Is it better for the player to stick to his initial choice, or to choose the
other door (that is, the door neither chosen by the player, nor opened by Monty)? The
intuitive answer is that the odds of success are the same, regardless of whether the player
sticks or switches. The correct answer is that the player should switch: the probability of
success if the player switches is twice the probability of success if he sticks to his original
choice. Not alone does it take some time to convince someone unfamiliar with the Monty
Hall problem that this judgment is correct, the proclamation that it is better to switch may
even draw scorn and laughter from people with extensive experience in probability.
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After convincing oneself of the veracity of the judgment that switching is the appropriate
response, the problem itself appears simple. It is not at all clear why so many should be
lead astray by this innocuous problem, which is so completely devoid of complexity.
Despite this, the student's intuitions, the tacit assumptions he brings with him, lead him
utterly to error.
The difficulty the modern student has with probability theory seems akin to the difficulty
the primitive has with the notion of chance events. A few months ago an MIT student,
who over the course of six or seven years took a healthy dose of probability theory and
mathematics at both undergraduate and graduate levels, dropped his scientific guard and
let slip the expression of the primitive: "Probability maybe useful but it is still nonsense.
While sitting on a limb of the probability tree, if you take a backwards glance it is clear:
there is only one branch and it is weighed with 100% probability all the way down the
line." A remark akin to Einstein's "God does not play at dice." The practical utility of
probability theory is beyond question. Whether or not it is more superstitious than the pre-
empirical conception of magic is a metaphysical question, which like most metaphysical
questions, is more likely to become irrelevant than be answered. We are left with this
simple conclusion: probability theory remains an area of the utmost difficulty to the
student, and this is likely because it goes against the grain of more basic intuitions
(instincts, assumptions).
The Ways of Pre-Empirical Medicine
Another phenomenon that will allow us to explore this propensity for hypothesis
formation in the face of the unknown is the art of the Shaman of primitive communities.
Apart from being the dominating figure in religious life, the Shaman is also "a magician
and medicine man; he is believed to cure, like all doctors, and to perform miracles of the
fakir type" (Eliade, Shamanism, p. 4). In the absence of the possibility of a reasonable
biological explanation, the medicine man is required to tend to the needs of his
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community. As a substitute, the Shamanistic system is, to our minds, obviously fantastic
and even absurd. To the people of his community, he provides an answer and a measure of
hope in the face of calamities of unknown origin and destination. He removes the dreadful
unknown, and replaces the grotesque face of chance (bad luck) with simple explanations --
explanations which at least allow his people to take some course of action.
The Shaman's healing powers stem from his soul's ability to leave the body, and travel to
the spiritual world. In Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy, Mircea Eliade
describes the medical functions of a north American Shaman (ibid., p. 300):
"Summoned to a sickbed, the North American Shaman first turns his attention to
discovering the cause of the illness. Two principal kinds of disease are
distinguished; those due to the introduction of a pathogenic object, and those
resulting from 'soul loss.' The treatment of the two cases is essentially different. In
the first the effort is directed to expelling the cause of the trouble, in the second to
finding and restoring the patient's fugitive soul."
When the cause of the illness is the presence of foreign objects, the Shaman must first
divine the cause, and then remove the object by sucking it out of the patient's body. The
foreign object may have been inserted by a sorcerer through magical invocation, or placed
there by a spirit. The cure is effected during a public ceremony involving the whole
community.
Eliade provides the example of the Paviotso Shaman (ibid., p. 302). The ceremony begins
with prayers, singing, and dancing on the part of the Shaman. Following this the Shaman
goes into a trance, during which his spirit leaves his body. If the nature of the illness is loss
of soul, the Shaman seeks the soul of the patient in the land of spirits, and if possible,
returns with it. When he comes out of the trance, he immediately relates the details of his
journey to the audience. In the case of the presence of a foreign body, the purpose of the
trance is to divine the nature and position of the object. When the Shaman returns, he
relates what he learned to the audience and removes the object from the patient by sucking
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it out through the skin. The Shaman first sucks blood from the patient, and spits it into a
hole. After this he continues to suck until he sucks out the magical object (pebble, worm,
etc.) which he shows to the audience. This he throws into the hole and covers with dust.
The healing process involves such ceremonies because illness is "regarded as a corruption
or alienation of the soul" (ibid., p. 217). The Shaman works on the threshold between the
world of the physical and the world of the spiritual. Here he is the protector of the psychic
integrity of the community. The Shamans are "pre-eminently the anti-demonic champions;
they combat not only demons and disease, but also the black magicians" (ibid., p. 508).
The Shaman's experience provides him with knowledge of the nature of death. He is guide
to the dead, and his knowledge addresses itself to the horrors that accompany the
uncertainties of death.
As a matter of interest, one can briefly question the efficacy of the role of the Shaman. The
profusion of the shamanistic art around the globe must indicate, even to our minds, that
the Shaman plays a useful role. There are many documented accounts of successful
healing rituals, where the stricken patient actually makes a remarkable recovery. The
psychotherapeutic effects of the shamanistic ceremony are beyond question. Firstly, the
practice of the art is believed to be (and probably is) extremely dangerous to the person of
the Shaman. Secondly, the entire community comes out for the ceremony. These two facts
must make it abundantly clear to the patient that he is a highly valued member of the
community. Thirdly, the Shaman provides an answer, and with this answer (this working
hypothesis) the crippling uncertainty, and the anxiety engendered thereby, are removed.
The detrimental effects of anxiety are well known. Under prolonged conditions,
glucocorticoids are released from the adrenal cortex. These actually hamper the
inflammatory processes of the body (which combat damage to its tissues) and reduce the
body's resistance to infection (Gray, Fear and Stress, p. 62). Given the complete absence
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of a more modern system of medicine, the efficacy of the art of the Shaman becomes
clearer, and the profusion of Shamanistic practice is perhaps not so surprising after all.
Early European Science: Alchemy
"At the same time I realize that such myths may be developed, and become
testable; that historically speaking all -- or very nearly all -- scientific theories
originate from myths, and that a myth may contain important anticipations of
scientific theories. [An example is] Empedocles' theory of evolution by trial and
error."
- Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, (p. 38).
Introduction
Turning our attention to Europe and the renaissance, we alight on another example of pre-
scientific thinking. The empirical methodology, which so utterly changed the face of
Europe over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was in an initial period
of germination. The 'science' of the day consisted in a haphazard collection of folklore,
old-wives tales, observations, and superstitions that were more or less obviously such. For
our part, we shall examine the precursor of chemistry, or alchemy. The common view of
alchemy holds that it was an attempt to transform base metals into gold through chemical
and magical means. Many of the great alchemists pursued greater prizes, for example the
elusive philosopher's stone -- often understood as a substance capable of facilitating any
manner of transformation. Carl Jung believed that for a number of the medieval and
renaissance alchemists, their art, or opus, was predominantly a psychological affair. In
fact, the texts of these natural philosophers of old were of tremendous use to him in both
his practice, and the development of his psychological theory. Over the course of its
lifetime, with it inception in the first or second millennium BC, and its demise during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, alchemy enjoyed a rich and varied history. Since our
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only concern with alchemy is to taste briefly of its attempts at scientific explanation, we
will limit ourselves in the study of this fascinating area to but a cursory glance.
The Gold
Gold, that ancient symbol of wealth and order, divinity and royalty, derives its intoxicating
characteristics from identification with the sun. Every morning the sun rises and dispels the
terrors and dangers of the night, returning order and security to the earth. The sun is the
prototype of the Hero: every evening he plunges into the sea, and there does battle with
the sea monster of the night, only to emerge triumphantly in the morning to light the new
day. In ancient Egypt, one cosmology describes Re the solar god as the creator and first
King who "put order (maCat) in the place of Chaos" (Eliade, History Vol. 1, p. 91). Re was
the father of the first Pharaoh, endowing the succeeding line of Pharaohs with divine
origins. Moreover, the Pharaoh as the current king and ruler, is the incarnation of the Sun
God on earth. He maintains the balance of maCat in the kingdom.
The divine and royal nature of the sun, and by association, gold, is also evident in
European culture. The Christ, the Son of God, the Savior and Ruler of men, is typically
depicted in paintings with a golden halo. This symbol of divinity is the symbolic
identification of Christ with the sun. The same holds true for the Crown, the premier
symbol of the King. It identifies the king not only with the Sun, and by extension with
order, but also links him to the divine, or the divine order. Each coin, round and golden,
also representative of the sun, bears the image of the king. It becomes easy to see how
gold can come to represent the highest value among material substances.
Jung writes (Jung, Psychology and Alchemy, pp. 343-344)
"A similar idea is to be found in Michael Maier [17th Century Alchemist]: The sun,
by its many millions of revolutions, spins the gold into the earth. Little by little the
sun has imprinted its image on the earth, and that image is the gold. The sun is the
image of God, the heart is the sun's image in man, just as gold is the sun's image in
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the earth ... and God is known in the gold. This golden image of God is the anima
aurea, which when breathed into common quicksilver, changes it into gold."
Early Origins
In Prelude to Chemistry: An Outline of Alchemy, John Read suggests that Alchemy
probably had its ultimate origins in Egypt, and from there spread to China and Europe.
The two main themes of alchemy were both present in ancient Egypt -- the attribution of
the highest value to gold, and the pursuit of the incorruptible body. The Egyptians had
long been fascinated by the mesmerizing powers of Gold. There is archeological evidence
that the Egyptians had expert goldsmiths as early as 3,000 BC, and were well skilled at
metallurgy, fabric dyeing and other chemical arts (Read, Prelude, pp. 4-6). The art of
mummification was also carried out in Egypt. At the time of his death, a man was
identified with Osiris, the immortal god of the underworld. Mummification was a literal
transformation of the corpse of the dead into an immortal god. It entailed bathing the
corpse in neter, or sodium hydrate, applying oil, and wrapping it in fabric. In ancient
Egyptian, the word 'neter' literally means 'god' (Franz, Psyche, p. 147). Thus the
Egyptians were not only concerned with gold, but also with aspects of immortality, both
prominent themes in alchemy.
European Alchemy was probably born from the combination of speculative Greek
philosophy and magical chemical techniques from Egypt. At the time, Aristotle's theory of
physical matter was dominant. This was the doctrine of the four elements: Earth, Water,
Air, Fire. These elements were due to different combinations of the four fundamental
qualities: Hot, Cold, Dry, Wet. Aristotle believed that all bodies were composed of the
four elements (earth, water, air, fire) in different proportions. It was thought that the
properties of matter could be altered by altering the proportions of the basic elements
(Read, Prelude, pp. 9-10). Thus, by altering the mixture of the elements in a base metal,
the alchemist believed that he could transmute these metals into gold. This marked the
beginning of the alchemical pursuit and the origins of chemistry.
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The Work
The belief that precious minerals were engendered and grew in the earth was a common
one. For example, it was thought that the diamond was ripe while the crystal was not ripe.
The crystal required more time in the oven or womb of the earth before it attained the
level of perfection of the diamond. "It is not without interest that these primitive
conceptions of the growth of metals were very long in dying out; they withstood centuries
of technical experience and rational thought (one has only to recall the mineralogical ideas
adaptable to Greek science)" (Eliade, Forge, p. 45). The same was thought to be true of
gold. The base metals were ripening in the womb of the earth, and if given enough time,
they would attain the perfect state of gold. Thus many alchemists believed that the
transformation of a baser metal into gold was simply a matter of accelerating and
perfecting the process of nature.
The actual work of the alchemist was a mixture of laboratory experimentation and what
we would now call mysticism. The process of transformation was thought to take place in
four stages, the blackening, the whitening, the yellowing, and the reddening. This was later
reduced to three: blackening, whitening and reddening. The blackness, or nigredo, was the
initial state. It represented the prima materia, or "primordial matter, from which all things
came and to which all things revert" (Read, Prelude, p. 10). The nigredo was considered
the initial chaos, and thought to be produced by the separation of the elements followed by
the union of the opposites as male and female. The death of the product of this union
would constitute the nigredo (Jung, Psychology and Alchemy, p. 230). The whitening
could be achieved either through the washing of the nigredo, or through the resurrection
of the nigredo by the reunification of the soul and the body. The final transformation, from
the white to the red, was achieved by raising the heat in the furnace. "The red and the
white are King and Queen, who may also celebrate their 'chymical wedding' at this stage"
(ibid., p. 232)
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This is an abstraction of the many different forms of the art of alchemy. The procedures
varied vastly, as did the language and symbolism used to describe the procedures and the
results obtained. The following passage quoted from Jung's Psychology and Alchemy
exemplifies the sometimes bizarre nature of the alchemical work (pp. 246-247)
"You shall take seven pieces of metal, of each and every metal as they are named
after the planets, and shall stamp on each the character of the planet in the house of
the same planet., and every piece shall be as large and as thick as a rose noble. But
of Mercury only the fourth part of an ounce by weight and nothing stamped upon
it.
Then put them after the order in which they stand in the heavens into a crucible,
and make all widows fast in the chamber that it may be quite dark within, then melt
them all together in the midst of the chamber and drop in seven drops of the
blessed Stone, and forthwith a flame of fire will come out of the crucible and
spread itself over the whole chamber (fear no harm), and will light up the whole
chamber more brightly than the sun and moon, and over your heads you shall
behold the whole firmament as it is in the starry heavens above, and the planets
shall hold to their appointed courses as in the sky. Let it cease of itself, in a quarter
of an hour everything will be in its own place."
]It is unnecessary to go into the details any further. It will suffice to say that these early
chemists, in the absence of better information, used mythical and religious conceptions to
explore the unknown chemical reactions they generated in their laboratories. Without the
aid of a 'more scientific' methodology, they used their fantasy, or imagination, to explore
the unknown in matter, to provide them with working hypotheses. Jung writes (Jung,
Psychology and Alchemy, p. 241)
"To do them justice we must add that all knowledge of the nature of chemistry and
its limitations was still completely closed to them, so that they were as much
entitled to hope as those who dreamed of flying and whose successors make the
dream come true after all. Nor should we underestimate the sense of satisfaction
born of the enterprise, the excitement of the adventure, of the quaerere (seeking)
and the invenire (finding). This always lasts as long as the methods employed seem
sensible. There was nothing at the time to convince the alchemist of the
senselessness of his chemical operations; what is more, he could look back on a
long tradition which contained not a few testimonies of such as had achieved the
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marvelous result. Finally the matter was not without promise, since a number of
useful discoveries did occasionally emerge as byproducts of his labors in the
laboratory. As the forerunner of chemistry alchemy had a sufficient raison d'etre.
Hence, even if alchemy had consisted in -- if you like -- an unending series of futile
and barren chemical experiments, it would be no more astonishing than the
venturesome endeavors of medieval medicine and pharmacology."
The Emerrence of Modern Science
Eventually two major trends emerged in European alchemy. One remained concerned with
the laboratory experiments, while the other focused more and more on spiritual issues.
With the publication of Robert Boyle's The Skeptical Chymist, the four element theory of
matter was replaced with the modern idea of the element (Read, Prelude, p. 31), and the
laboratory pursuit of the philosopher's gold was gradually replaced by the more familiar
methodology that we now call chemistry. The spiritual side of alchemy developed into
hermetic philosophy (Jung, Psychology, p. 227). However, this philosophy did not endure
long with the emergence of the more rationalistic spirit of the enlightenment. Thus, after a
life span of some two thousand years, the practice of alchemy came to a gradual end over
the course of the 17th and 18th centuries.
While it may be impossible to determine in any precise way the influence alchemy had on
the development of modern science, the fact that the errors of the alchemists were useful
cannot be denied. Paracelsus introduced chemistry into medicine, crude as his chemistry
may have been at the time; and it was Robert Boyle's alchemical work that lead him to the
conclusions which served as the corner stone for the building of chemistry.
Sir Isaac Newton, father of modern science, spent many years studying alchemical texts
and running experiments in his laboratory. He believed that the secrets of nature had been
imparted to a select few through divine revelation. He thought that this information had
subsequently been lost. Only fragments of it remained in mythical form. As such it would
remain hidden from the vulgar. The rest could be rediscovered through experimentation
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(Eliade, History Vol. 3, p. 260). Dobbs believed that Newton never doubted the general
validity of alchemy and his career can be seen as an attempt to integrate alchemy and
mechanical philosophy (ibid., pp. 260-261). It is interesting that, on the publication of his
Principia Newton's opponents claimed that his 'forces' were 'occult qualities.' In a way,
Dobbs agrees: "Newton's forces were very much like the hidden sympathies and
antipathies found in much of the occult literature of the Renaissance period. But Newton
had given forces an ontological status equivalent to that of matter and motion. By so
doing, and by quantifying the forces, he enabled the mechanical philosophies to rise above
the level of imaginary impact mechanisms" (Dobbs, quoted in ibid., p. 261). Considering
Newton's work on forces, Richard Westfall concluded that modern science is the result of
the wedding of hermetic philosophy and the mechanical philosophy (ibid.).
Paracelsus: Physician, Scientist, Mystic
Theophrastus Paracelsus is thought to have been one of the first men to incorporate the
ways of chemistry into medicine. It may be instructive to briefly consider his medical
system. With its mixture of mysticism and chemistry, it may even constitute a midpoint in
the progression of medical science from the Shaman to modern medicine. Paracelsus was
born at Einsiedeln Switzerland in November 1493. By 1525 his reputation as a physician
earned him an invitation to the university at Basal, but his scorn for his colleagues and the
academic medicine of the day soon drove him to resume his travels about Europe and
Russia. It was on his constant wanderings that he derived his vast experience. Jung
describes him as "a pragmatist and empiricist without parallel (Jung, Paracelsus, p. 11).
As an alchemist, Paracelsus was thoroughly materialistic. For him "the spiritual principle
takes second place, this being the anima mundi that proceeds from matter" (ibid., p. 9).
Though he was an animist, projecting anthropomorphic spirits into matter, his materialistic
outlook (that matter is primary) helped pave the way for the development of the empirical
methodology, still some centuries in the future. Consequently, as well as being a pioneer in
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the medicine of his day, his work contributed to the founding of natural science, and
modern chemistry.
In The Book Paragranum, Paracelsus sets forth the physicians work (Jung, Paracelsus
The Physician, p. 18). The physician must look outside the patient for the clues to the
patient's ailment. "Only external things give knowledge of the internal; without them no
internal things may be known" (Paracelsus, quoted from ibid., p. 18). The physician must
be an alchemist. He must know the ailments of the elements as these correspond to those
of man. He must also be familiar with the transformations of alchemy -- he must
understand the alchemy (digestive transformation) of the stomach (ibid., p. 19). The
physician must also be an astrologer. The microcosm (body) is inextricably bound up with
the macrocosm (heavens) -- without knowledge of the heavens the physician remains
incapable of understanding the body (ibid., p. 20). Paracelsus was also a firm believer in
the powers of magic, and was known to employ amulets and seals in his practice. Finally,
Paracelsus practiced the ancient art of charming an illness, which was also practiced in
ancient Egypt. His method, the Theorica, was a religious cure, whereby the physician
spoke to the patient as though with the grandiose words of God. Jung believed that a fair
portion of Paracelsus' success could perhaps be attributed to this intuitively devised,
psychotherapeutic method (ibid., pp. 28-29).
Alchemy: Conclusion
The alchemist drew from astrology, religion, mysticism, and whatever else offered itself as
a useful analogy, and used these to help him explore unknown worlds. Using such tools as
were available, he built hypotheses about the hidden laws of nature, and explored the
consequences of these hypotheses. These hypotheses were the products of his imagination
-- and despite their sometimes bizarre form, were inevitable, and formed the necessary
course of early science. As we turn our attention to Piaget's study of the early pre-
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scientific explanations of modern children, we see similar patterns in the types of
hypotheses they generate.
Pre-Scientific Explanation in Childhood
Animism
In The Child's Conception of the World, using the method of clinical interview, Piaget
attempts to specify and examine the child's pre-scientific view of the world. Rather than
using ideas of mechanical causality, the child finds explanation for many classes of
phenomena by endowing the objects in his environment with life and consciousness. This
he called animism. The word animism was initially used by anthropologists to describe the
manner in which primitive peoples endow nature with souls and living spirits. Piaget uses
the term in the same sense with children. Animism is the propensity of children to endow
objects with consciousness and life, to animate the objects in their environment.
Piaget noticed four stages of animism. For children in the first stage, all objects may be
conscious. For children of the second stage, only objects that move are conscious. For
children of the third stage, all objects that move of themselves are conscious. This
excludes objects that are obviously moved by external agents. In the fourth and final stage,
children attribute consciousness only to animals.
As an illustration of the first stage, Piaget provides the following examples. These were
taken from two interviews with a child, the first at age eight and a half and the second at
age nine and a half. The first interview went as follows (ibid., pp. 174-175):
Vel (8.5) says that only animals could feel a prick, thus showing he is able to differentiate in this
answers. What he means, as a matter of fact, is that only animals can feel pain. Clouds, for
example, should not feel a prick. "Why not? -- Because they are only air. -- Can they feel the
wind or not? -- Yes, it drives them. -- Can they feel heat? -- Yes." But as far as mere
consciousness is concerned, any object may be conscious at times; "Can the bench feel anything?
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-- No. -- If someone burnt it, would it feel that? -- Yes -- Why? -- Because it would get smaller. --
Does a wall feel anything? -- No. -- Would it feel it if it was knocked down? -- Yes. -- Why? --
Because that would break it" A moment later: "If I pull off this button (a coat button), will it feel
it? -- Yes. -- Why? -- Because the thread would break. -- Would that hurt it? -- No, but it would
feel that it was tearing it." "Does the moon know it moves or not? -- Yes. -- Does the bench know
it is here? -- Yes. -- You really thinks so? Are you sure or not sure? -- Not sure. -- What makes
you think perhaps it doesn't know? -- because it is made of wood. -- And what makes you think it
may know? -- Because it is here." "When the wind blows against the Saleve, does it feel there is
a mountain there or not? -- Yes. -- Why? -- Because it goes over it." "Does a bicycle knows it
goes? -- Yes. -- Why? -- Because it goes. -- Does it know when it is made to stop? -- Yes. -- What
does it know with? -- The pedals. -- Why? -- Because they stop going. -- You think so really? --
Yes (we laugh). -- And do you think I think so? -- No. -- But you think so? Can the sun see us? --
Yes. -- What does it see us with? -- With its rays. -- Has it got eyes? -- I don't know.
The same subject at nine and a half years (ibid., pp. 175-176):
We hung a metal box from a double string and placed it in front of Vel, in such a way that, on
letting go of the box, the string unwound making the box turn round and round. "Why does it
turn? -- Because the string is twisted. -- Why does the string turn too? -- Because it wants to
unwind itself -- Why? -- Because it wants to be unwound (= it wants to resume its original
position, in which the string was unwound). -- Does the string know it is twisted? -- Yes. -- Why?
-- Because it wants to untwist itself it knows it's twisted! -- Does it really know it is twisted? --
Yes. I am not sure. -- How do you think it knows? -- Because it feels it is all twisted."
During the second stage, consciousness becomes restricted to objects that move. Of this,
Piaget gives a number of examples (ibid., p. 180):
Kae (age 11) spontaneously unites consciousness with movement: "Does the sun know anything?
-- Yes, it heats. -- Does it know that it's hidden from us in the evening? -- Yes, because it sees the
clouds in front of it ... no, it doesn't know, because it isn't it that hides. It's the clouds that go in
front of it." Thus, if the sun hid itself, it would know, but since it is hidden without having done
anything itself, it doesn't know. "Does a bicycle know when it goes? -- Yes it feels the ground."
"Does a motor know when it goes? -- Yes, it feels it isn't still in the same place."
Pug (age 7 yrs. 2 mths.): "Does the sun know when it sets? -- Yes. -- Does it know it gives light? -
- No. -- Why not? -- Because it hasn't any eyes, it can 'tfeel it." "Does a bicycle know anything?
-- No. -- Why not? -- I mean it knows when it goes fast and when it goes slowly. -- Why do you
think it knows? -- I don't know, but I think it knows. -- Does a motor know when it's going? --
Yes. -- Is it alive? -- No, but it knows. -- Is it the driver who knows or the motor? -- The driver. --
And the motor? -- It knows too." Benches, tables, stones, walks, etc., neither feel nor know
anything.
At the third stage the child denies consciousness of anything which does not move by
itself, for example (ibid., pp. 182-183):
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Ross (age 9 yrs. 9 mths.) started by ascribing consciousness to animals but refusing it to the table:
"Would a table feel it if I were to prick it? -- No. -- Why not? -- Because it is not a person. -- Can
the fire feel anything? -- No. -- If someone threw water on it, would it feel that? -- No. -- Why
not? -- Because it is not a person. -- Does the wind feel anything when the sun is not shining? --
Yes. -- Doesn't it know it is blowing? -- Yes. -- Does the sun feel anything? -- Yes. -- What does it
feel? -- It feels it's heating, etc." Ross likewise attributes consciousness to the stars, the moon,
the rain and streams, but refuses it to bicycles, motors and boats. "Are you sure of all this or not
very? -- Not very. -- Have you thought about it before? -- No. -- Why aren't you very sure? -- I
haven't learned it. -- You say the wind feels something, but you aren't quite sure. Tell me what
you think, what makes you think that perhaps the wind doesn't feel when it is blowing? --
Because it is not a person. -- And why do you think perhaps it does feel? -- Because it is it (!)
that blows" "The lake knows its name? -- Yes, because it moves. -- It knows it moves? -- Yes,
because it's it that moves."
Finally, at the fourth stage, consciousness is attributed only to animals and maybe plants.
Not surprisingly, the belief that the sun and moon are alive is not so easily shaken, as it is
for clouds, for example, or bicycles. Any knowledge of the history of religious ideas
would have led us to suspect nothing less. A couple of examples will suffice (ibid., p.
1 86):
Pig (age 9) denies consciousness to the clouds, to fire and to a flower "because it isn't alive." But
the sun is able to feel: "Why? -- Because it is alive." The stars cannot feel "Because they are just
sparks." -- And isn't the sun a spark? -- No, it's a light." The moon also is conscious, but not the
clouds, because they are "made of smoke" and smoke "can't move". "Can the clouds move by
themselves? -- No. -- And the moon? -- Yes." Fire can't feel anything "because you have to make
it," neither can a stream because "it's the air that makes it move."
Gol (age 6, very advanced) restricts consciousness to animals and the moon "because, at night, it
always goes to the same place." Fire, on the other hand, is not so conscious "because it always
stays in the same place," neither are clouds because "the wind drives them"
Artiicialism
Another aspect of childhood explanation is what Piaget termed artificialism. This he
defines as the tendency to assume that objects are products of human creation, rather than
attributing their existence to some manner of material causality. At a later stage, creation
is attributed to more natural causes. A few examples will suffice.
Gaud (age 6 yrs. 8 mths.) "What is the moon like? -- Round. Sometimes there is only half of it. --
Why is there only half of it? -- Because that is how it starts. -- Why? -- Because there is a lot of
54 Learning and Computers
daylight (he means that the moon remains small during the day and only grows at night). --
Where is the other half? -- That's because it is notfinished. -- What does it make itself like? --
Round. -- How does it begin? -- Quite small; then it keeps on getting bigger. -- Where does it
come from? -- From Heaven. -- How does it make itself? - Quite tiny. -- Does it make itself all
alone? -- No, God does it. -- How? -- With his hands." Gaud adds that the moon is alive and
conscious. It deliberately follows us about, etc. The sun is equally alive and has been made.
Caud (age 9 yrs. 4 mths.) "How did the sun start? -- With heat. -- What heat? -- From the fire. --
Where is the fire? -- In Heaven. -- How did it start? -- God lit it with wood and coal. -- Where did
he get the wood and coal? -- He made it. -- How did the fire make the sun? -- The fire is the sun."
Up to now it seems that Caud is no longer animistic but this is not so: "Does the sun see us? --
No. -- Does it feel the heat? -- Yes. -- Does it see at night? -- No. -- Does it see in the day? -- Yes,
of course! it sees because it makes the light for itself."
After a transmission period, the origins are attributed to natural causes (ibid., pp. 273-
277):
Font (age 6 yrs. 9 mths.) says that the sun is conscious, it is made of fire and it comes 'from the
mountain. -- Where from? -- From the mines. -- What is it? -- People go looking for coal in the
ground." As to the moon: "It was made by the sun. -- How? -- With the fire from the mountain. --
Where does the moon come from? -- From the mountain. -- What was there in the mountain? --
The sun. -- Where does the sun come from? -- From the mountain. -- How did it begin? -- With
fire. -- And how did this fire begin? -- With matches. -- And how did the mountain begin -- With
the earth ... it was people who made it."
Chal (age 9 yrs. 5 mths.): "How did the sun begin? -- (Thoughtfully) First it was small, then it
got big. -- Where did this little sun come from? -- If must have been made by the clouds. --What
is the sun made of? -- Of air." As to the clouds they also come from the air.
Aud (age 9 yrs. 8 mths.) "What is the sun made of? -- Of clouds. -- How did the sun begin? -- To
begin with, it was a ball and then it caught fire." The clouds from which the sun was born also
came from the sky, the sun is, therefore, "a cloudfrom the sky."
Ant (age 8.5 yrs.): "How did the moon begin? -- The stars ran into each other, and that made the
moon. -- And where do the stars come from? -- They are flames which have always been there
from the beginning."
The Child: Tabula Rasa or Active Hypothesis Generator
As is evident from the explanations offered, the child has not yet received a causal
explanation of the origin of the moon and the stars. Yet he is not a blank tablet awaiting
the scribblings of the astronomer or physicist. He has a number of working hypotheses,
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which he uses in the absence of better explanations. The question of the value of these
hypotheses is a separate one from that of their existence. The belief that the child is a
passive recipient of information, and does not play a very active role in constructing his
conception of the environment is surely untenable in the face of this evidence. In his book,
Piaget provided a great number of examples. The existence of common themes in the
children's explanations is almost as surprising as it is interesting.
Conclusions
Examples drawn from the areas of anthropology, history of science, and child psychology
provide overwhelming evidence that humans have a strong propensity to generate
hypotheses in the face of the unknown. It is also evident that these initial explanations are
mythical in structure. What are the consequences of this for education?
There are at least two obvious ones. Firstly, when receiving instruction on a new topic, the
student may possess any number of ideas that he may bring to bear on the new topic.
These may have been collected by the student while exploring other problem domains, or
may have been hypothesized in the early stages of instruction. They may be more or less
rational or irrational, and may either help the student by leading him to an improved
formulation of ideas, or hinder him by misleading him. If these ideas are not addressed,
their effect will be left to chance. So the first consequence for education is that, in order to
assimilate new information, pre-existing ideas should be explicitly challenged by the new
circumstances. This will help to remove the element of chance.
The conclusions we have reached so far indicate that the subject constructs all new
knowledge. The second consequence for education therefore pertains to the way we
approach learning. The question, simply put, is this: should we continue to teach by
providing a top down presentation of material, and hope that portions of this will be
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assimilated over the course of continual repetition; or should we engage and employ the
human's powerful faculty for hypothesis generation. I think that the answer is obvious.
The following chapter, a study of the ways of science, is intended both to reinforce this
position, and to explore the possibility of formalizing this approach to learning. The thesis,
expounded more clearly in the final chapter, is this: in some domains, the reciprocal
process of teaching and learning could be replaced by active exploration and
experimentation.
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The Scient fic Pursuit
"While I wanted to think everything false, it must necessarily be that I who thought
was something; and remarking that this truth, I think, therefore I am, was so solid
and so certain that all the most extravagant suppositions of the skeptics were
incapable of upsetting it, I judged that I could receive it without scruple as the first
principle of the philosophy that I sought."
- Rene Descartes (quoted from Russell, History, p. 564).
"When I analyze the process that is expressed in the sentence, "I think," I find a
whole series of daring assertions that would be difficult, perhaps impossible to
prove ... In place of the "immediate certainty" in which the people may believe in
the case at hand, the philosopher thus finds a series of metaphysical questions
presented to him, truly searching questions for the intellect; to wit: "From where
do I get the concept of thinking? Why do I believe in cause and effect? What gives
me the right to speak of an ego, and even of an ego as a cause, and finally of an
ego as the cause of thought?" Whoever ventures to answer these metaphysical
questions at once by an appeal to a sort of intuitive perception, like the person
who says, "I think, and know that this, at least, is true, actual, and certain" -- will
encounter a smile and two questions marks from a philosopher nowadays. "Sir,"
the philosopher will perhaps give him to understand, "it is improbable that you are
not mistaken; but why insist on the truth?" --"
- Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (pp. 24-25).
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The Meaning of Truth
We now turn briefly to an old and well-trodden topic in philosophy -- that is, the meaning
of truth, and our ability to capture and hold it. Our interest here is not metaphysical, but
rather, practical. Out of the many different ways of looking at the universe, and the many
different conceptions of the meaning of the words "truth" and "certainty," we wish to
answer a simple question: "What shall we tell our students?" In other words, what are the
educational consequences of holding a particular metaphysical conception of the certainty
and stability of our knowledge of the world. By "educational consequences" we mean,
what effect such a conception will have on the training, and consequent research activities,
of our young scientists.
The early epistemological optimism of Bacon and Descartes was built on the idea that
truth was manifest (Popper, Conjectures, p. 5). Though it may be obscured, a little care on
the part of the observer could remove this obscurity, allowing for immediate and certain
recognition of the truth. Descartes believed that all things that are conceived very clearly
and distinctly are true. Thus, we are entitled to apodictic knowledge of mathematics and
physics, so long as we did not rely upon our senses, which may in fact lead us into error.
The mind, employing the light of reason, allows us apodictic knowledge of the true nature
of things. For Descartes, this is due to the existence of God. Since God exists and is good,
if we distinctly perceive something as true, we will not be deceived. Thus the laws of
mathematics and physics must be true, and certain -- else we should not perceive them as
such (Russell, History, pp. 564-568).
Locke, on the other hand, insisted that all human knowledge is ultimately derived from
sense-perception -- that is from experience of the external world. This theme was picked
up by Berkeley who proffered the argument that matter does not have an existence apart
from perception of it. That matter may continue to exist is due to its being constantly
perceived by God (Russell, History, p. 647). Hume pushed the view to its logical
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conclusion, and suggested that we do not even possess firm grounds for belief in the
existence of the external world. He himself thought that such a conclusion was perhaps no
more than an idle curiosity. Despite this, two of his arguments were of profound
importance, and had a corresponding effect on science and philosophy. The first of these is
against the assumption, fundamental to science, that every event is anticipated by its cause,
and moreover, that there is a necessary connection between these two events (cause and
effect). Hume stated plainly that while we may consistently witness the conjunction of two
types of events, we have no perceptual access to a necessary connection. Thus we have no
right to speak of causal relationships as real and necessary. The second, his argument
against the certainty of induction, seems to this day to be conclusive. That we have
observed regularities in the past is not grounds enough to guarantee that that regularity
will persist in the future. The net result of these inquiries was the conclusion that, while
nature may appear to correspond to so-called laws, there are no grounds for assuming
that she actually does, or that she will continue to do so. In other words, nature does not
necessarily conform to the laws that science may set for her, and we are forever denied
exact knowledge of her inner workings.
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason specifically addressed the issue of endowing science with
apodictic certainty. According to Kant, nature as a thing in itself, is inaccessible to us. We
only have access to our experience of nature. This much he would cede to Hume. It was
also this idea that helped him to circumvent the problems raised by Hume. According to
Kant, the apparatus with which we experience nature orders our experience according to
the intuitions (anschauung) of time and space, and subsumes all judgments of experience
under the categories of the understanding. The propositions of mathematics and physics
describe the apparatus of experience, not nature as a thing-in-itself. Since this apparatus is
given independent of experience, or a priori, these propositions escape the uncertainty
associated with inductive knowledge.
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Kant's solution, while certainly daring, feels more like a trick than a real answer. As we
are well aware, nature effectively resists our attempts to impose our laws upon her. Kant's
answer was an attempt to find a permanent place in our knowledge for Euclidean
geometry and Newtonian mechanics. We now know that there are other useful geometries
beside Euclidean. Newtonian mechanics works well enough for a midrange of events, but
it was far from the final answer in physics. Quantum theory currently rules the very small,
while relativity theory rules the very large. Kant's theory was an attempt to demonstrate
that Newtonian mechanics must always hold true. But it does not. The only way to save
the transcendental philosophy from this refutation is through an ad hoc modification. What
would this modified theory look like? Perhaps it would continue to insist that we may only
experience nature through our intuitions, and our intuitions order experience depending on
whether we witness the very large or the very small -- perhaps it would recommend an
intuition which changes its a priori rules a posteriori. An apparent contradiction. Kant's
proposition, that we may know nature with certainty a priori because the workings of our
intuitions are given independent of experience, does not seem to have provided us with
final certainty. Where then does that leave us?
Should we strive after an absolute truth or settle for a more relativistic view? In a lecture
entitled Pragmatism's Conception of Truth, delivered at the Lowell institute in Boston in
1906, William James set forth his own interpretation of the word 'truth.' In a somewhat
characteristic fashion, James sets forth the pragmatist's position: given that an idea is true,
what difference will it make in concrete terms. "What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in
experimental terms?" "True ideas," he says, "are those that we can assimilate, validate,
corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot" (James, Pragmatism, p. 97)
He considers verification and validation in practical terms. The process of verifying a
proposition consists in acting as though it were true. The sequence of actions thus
instigated may be compared to reality. If this comparison results in the perception of a
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harmonious progression of agreement, our original proposition may be considered to be
true.
The agreement to reality is three-fold. It requires agreement with the concrete and abstract
facts, and connections perceived intuitively between these, as well as agreement with the
body of truths already possessed by the individual. Thus the pragmatist's conception of
truth is as follows: A proposition is true if its consequences are in harmonious agreement
with the facts, and the current body of knowledge (James, Pragmatism, p. 102). And what
of ultimate truth? "The 'absolutely' true," says James, "is that ideal vanishing-point
towards which we imagine that all our temporary truths will someday converge."
This view is indeed attractive. It disposes of much metaphysical claptrap by giving an
operational definition to truth. There is one obvious objection to such a view. If, as the
pragmatist suggests, something is true in as much as it promotes our categorical well
being, how can we determine truth independent of ethical considerations. Such a
conception of truth would result in a reversion to a world view that predates the hard-won
scientific outlook we inherited from the Europeans of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
centuries. "What is?" and "What should be?" would once again be confused, and the inner
workings of science would once again be subservient to ethical considerations.
This view of truth also allows things to be true only in so far as they agree with what we
see, and what we believe to be possible. There are a number of difficulties with such a
position. Firstly, observation is only possible in the light of a theory. Karl Popper provided
a simple demonstration of this at a lecture in Vienna (Popper, Conjectures, p. 46). He
gave his audience the following task: to spend a few minutes observing, and write down
everything they observed. His students were understandably baffled and inquired what it is
that they should observe. We cannot simply observe -- the manifold of experience is by far
too chaotic to allow for meaningful observation without the ordering effect of a leading
idea. We may however search for something. This may be confirmation of an expected
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result, or detection of a result which was not expected. But all searching is guided by the
expected result. Sometimes it is necessary to step outside the theory currently held to be
true and adapt a new one simply to become aware of problems. In Against Method, Paul
Feyerabend provides an excellent description of such strategies, and we shall have
occasion to return to these later.
When such an instrumental definition of truth is in effect, it hampers the progress of
scientific research. A theory that is held to be true because of its utility may not allow for
the latitude that is sometimes required for the unearthing of counter-evidence. Bertrand
Russell argued that such an instrumental view of truth must inevitably lead to authoritarian
and totalitarian situations (Popper, Conjectures, pp. 4-5). Karl Popper is inclined to agree.
But what alternatives do these two suggest. Speaking of the scientific philosopher, Russell
(Our Knowledge of the External World, pp. 240-241) recognizes the difficulty of
maintaining the belief in an objective truth and the possibility that the researcher may attain
to such truth. Faced with continual error, it is easily understood how the researcher may
succumb to an instrumental conception of truth. Russell believes that maintaining the ideal
of an objective truth, and pursuing that ideal, is the one of the highest, and most difficult
of virtues for the researcher. Popper suggests a position of critical rationality. For Popper,
there is objective truth, and moreover it is above human authority. However, Hume's
conclusion that we are unable to know nature with certainty is unavoidable. Therefore we
must recognize our knowledge as conjectural, and use our critical judgment to reject
obviously false conjectures whenever possible. For Popper, it is impossible for us to know
nature with certainty. Our task is to successively approximate objective truth through a
continual process of elimination of error.
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T. S. Kuhn: Paradigms of Science
"We habitually act upon hypotheses, but not precisely as we act upon what we
consider certainties; for when we act upon a hypothesis we keep our eyes open for
fresh evidence."
- Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, (p. 815).
In his study The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Thomas Kuhn outlines the
characteristics of what he calls normal science, and science in a state of crisis. He
describes paradigms as new ideas that are sufficiently novel as to attract adherents away
from competing ideas, and still contain a number of conundrums which new practitioners
may work at solving. Once a new paradigm is in place, normal science busies itself with
settling the details of the new paradigm. Some of the tasks undertaken are: determining
the details of the paradigm with greater precision; resolving some of the remaining
ambiguities; and attempting to resolve novel problems, perhaps even from other domains,
using the tools of the new paradigm.
He also describes science in a state of crisis. This occurs during the transition period
between different paradigms. By filtering through the history of science, Kuhn noticed that
as the scientific endeavor continues under the rubric of a current paradigm, data are
gathered which can not be explained by the paradigm. Kuhn calls these data anomalies.
When an anomaly is uncovered the typical reactions are to 1) ignore the result, 2) assume
it is an error, 3) perform an ad hoc modification of the paradigm, or 4) set it aside as a
conundrum. As science advances under a particular paradigm, experimental and measuring
techniques become more sophisticated. Over time, the number of anomalies multiplies.
The weight of the anomalies eventually causes a scientific revolution -- that is a switch to
a new paradigm, and the process begins anew. Kuhn states (Kuhn, Structure, p. 77): "the
decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another,
64 Learning and Computers
and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with
nature and with each other."
It is interesting that the new paradigm which emerges from the scientific revolution has
often been anticipated, in a more or less complete form, sometimes long before the
emergence of the crisis. These anticipations are usually ignored, since they are out-shone
by the explanatory power of the current paradigm. Kuhn cites one example (Kuhn,
Structure, p. 75):
"The only complete anticipation is also the most famous, that of Copernicus by
Aristarchus in the third century BC. It is often said that if Greek science had been
less deductive and less ridden by dogma, heliocentric astronomy might have begun
its development eighteen centuries earlier than it did."
Kuhn notes that this view ignores the problem in its historical context, and fails to account
for the explanatory power of Ptolemaic astronomy. Yet the possibilities must give us
pause. Soon we shall consider the value of working within the current paradigm, and the
advantage of being able to step outside it.
Karl Popper: Coniectures and Refutations
Before addressing the issue of stepping outside the prevailing paradigm, we turn our
attention to Karl Popper's theory of scientific discovery. In his book Conjectures and
Refutations he describes his ideas as originating from two sources. The first was his
concern over the issue of scientific demarcation. The question for which he sought an
answer was: When is a theory a scientific theory? He placed the problem in a historical
context, and for the sake of exposition it may benefit us to do the same. His immediate
difficulty concerned two new theories at the turn of the century -- these were Einstein's
theory of relativity and Freud's theory of psychoanalysis (Popper, Conjectures, p. 34).
Both theories laid claim to being scientific theories, yet he felt that Einstein's theory was
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of a different character than Freud's. In trying to resolve this difficulty, he came to the
conclusion that a theory is only scientific in so far as it may be refuted (ibid., p. 37).
He considered the aforementioned theories in the light of this so-called criterion for
demarcation. Primarily he considered the difference between a perspective bent on
verification and one inclined towards refutation. It is not difficult, says Popper, to gather
data that verify a theory. Astrology provides an obvious example of this. All good tests of
a theory consist in an attempt to refute it. A verification may be useful, but only in so far
as it is a verification of a risky prediction, that is, a prediction upon which the theory
differs from reasonable competing theories. He cites Eddington's result of 1919 as a
successful, and useful attempt at failing to refute relativity. Psychoanalysis, on the other
hand, is not capable of refutation, since all possible results can be explained from within
the theoretical framework (ibid., p. 35).
This was his problem of scientific demarcation, and its solution. The second source of his
theory of scientific progress has its origins in Hume's Treatise on Human Nature. Popper
found Hume's demonstration that scientific induction lacks logical certainty conclusive. It
was with Hume's psychological explanation for the belief in induction that Popper took
issue. Hume believed that we are accustomed, by habit, to seeing regularities in
experience. Since we have a history of observing the constant conjunction of two events
(called cause and effect), we are in the habit of seeking a 'cause' for every 'effect'
observed. But, for a situation to qualify as a repetition, similarities across situations must
be recognized. The manifold of experience is too chaotic for similarities to simply be
detected. All the failed attempts of artificial intelligence theorists to procure pattern
matching programs bear witness to this difficulty. Popper rightly argues that it is
impossible for similarities to simply be recognized as obviously such -- they must be
actively sought in experience. This is similar to asking a room full of people to observe.
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"Observe what?," they will immediately demand. The subject actively seeks regularities in
experience. Popper states (ibid., p. 46):
"Without waiting, passively, for repetitions to impress or impose regularities upon
us, we actively try to impose regularities upon the world. We try to discover
similarities in it, and to interpret it in terms of laws invented by us. Without waiting
for premises we jump to conclusions. These may have to be discarded later, should
observation show that they are wrong. This was a theory of trial and error -- of
conjectures and refutations."
The Logic of Scientific Discovery
It is clear then, observation without a theoretical framework, a leading hypothesis, is
impossible. We impose our expectations on the world, and order the data of our
experience according to these expectations. The clinical psychologist, George Kelly,
outlined a theory of mental disturbances based on such an idea (Rychlak, Personality, pp.
708-748). When an individual has a framework of expectations that is maladjusted, he may
continue to force all interpretations of experience into such a framework of expectancy.
Kelly's method of treatment was to attempt to directly modify his patient's expectancy
framework. Popper describes two attitudes, the dogmatic attitude, and the critical attitude.
These two attitudes are similar in their willingness to adapt a new framework of
expectancy or hypothesis, but differ in their willingness to let it go (Popper, Conjectures,
p. 49). An individual with a dogmatic outlook will tend to try to massage the facts until
they fit into the framework of his leading idea. Facts that do not fit may be ignored, or
their existence may even be denied. Such an attitude is destined for a maladjusted end.
As an alternative to this, Popper advocates a critical attitude. A researcher will use a
theory and capitalize on its explanatory power. He should neither be too quick, nor too
slow to abandon the theory. Some theories are difficult, and can only be developed
through a process of successive approximations. To give up on a theory too quickly can
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obviously be a terrible mistake. Despite this, a critical researcher will always be on the
lookout for data which refute his working hypothesis. As John Eccles said (Popper,
Conjectures, p. 3), "I can now rejoice even in the falsification of a cherished theory,
because even this is a scientific success."
Thus Popper's logic of scientific discovery is as follows. Science progresses through a
process of hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing. In order for a hypothesis to be
scientific, in the strictest sense, it should be testable -- that is, it should be falsifiable. The
attitude of the researcher to the hypothesis should be critical. He should take care not to
give up on a fledgling hypothesis too quickly. One that shows initial promise, despite some
discouraging results, may eventually lead to a better theory -- a theory that is a closer
approximation to the truth. This attitude should only be held towards a theory which is
obviously in its early stages of development. More generally, the researcher should
actively try to refute the current theory. A theory's value can be measured in terms of the
number of genuine attempts at refutation it has withstood. Such an approach is necessary.
Unless we are to admit that science has become static, that it is no longer in a state of flux
and there remains nothing to be explained. Science may only progress by considering each
theory as a step, a useful error, along the road to truth. This is the critical attitude. An
attitude that does not claim to lay hold of the naked truth, but runs on before itself in its
eagerness to eliminate error.
The Ways of Counter Induction
To round out this discussion of the scientific method, I would like to consider an issue
raised by Paul Feyerabend in his book Against Method. Here he advocates the use of what
he calls counter induction. First, he argues, all observation presupposes a theoretical
background -- a framework of expectancy. And second, all observation must necessarily
be a function of the framework under which it is made. Sometimes it may be useful, even
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necessary, to adapt a theory which either a) disagrees with the current paradigm (in
Kuhn's sense), b) disagrees with the facts, or c) disagrees with both. This he calls counter
induction -- an idea that is not so absurd as it may initially seem.
The method of counter induction can be justified through two considerations. First: all
observations are a function of the leading theory. It may be necessary to step outside the
current paradigm (whose explanatory power may be tremendous), and adapt a newly
conjectured theory. This may be required simply to unearth the very observations
necessary to correct, or refute, the leading paradigm. Second: Since data is gathered in the
light of a theory, a newly hypothesized theory could easily disagree with established facts,
without this being any reflection upon the new theory. All this suggests prima facie is that
facts gathered under a current theory do not conform to the expectations of a new theory.
This says nothing of the facts which may be gathered under the new theory.
Feyerabend illustrates his point with the example of Galileo. It is Galileo's attempt to
convince his contemporaries of the correctness of the Copernican cosmology. His point of
attack is the so-called tower argument that the Aristotelians used to support the thesis that
the earth is stationary. In his Dialogue Galileo states (quoted from Feyerabend, Against
Method, p. 55):
"Heavy bodies ... falling down from on high, go by a straight and vertical line to
the surface of the earth. This is considered an irrefutable argument for the earth
being motionless. For, if it made the diurnal rotation, a tower from whose top a
rock was let fall, being carried by the whirling of the earth, would travel many
hundreds of yards to the east in the time the rock would consume in its fall, and the
rock ought to strike the earth that distance away from the base of the tower"
This is an excellent example of the dependence of observation on theory. Since the earth is
assumed to be motionless, the vertical motion of the rock is thought to confirm this
theory. It should be borne in mind that this interpretation held sway until the seventeenth
century. By stepping outside the current paradigm, and considering a theory that was
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counter to both the current paradigm and the facts, Galileo was able to uncover the flaw in
the tower argument that was invisible from within the Aristotelian perspective. By enticing
his readers to consider relative motion on-board ships and coaches, Galileo was able to
demonstrate that the observations were in line with the theory that the earth was in
motion, and that the Aristotelians confused absolute motion with relative motion. This is
an example of truly exceptional scientific inquiry.
The potential advantage of the occasional use of counter induction should now be
obvious. No doubt, it is as obvious as the potential harm inherent in its misuse. "There is,"
it will be objected, "infinite scope for abusing such a methodology. Science may be
reduced to an exercise in chasing one's tail." This it true -- yet the danger inherent in a
new method is no grounds for its banishment. We advocate Popper's suggestion -- that we
retain a critical attitude. This means that the researcher can, with profit, decide when it is
time to stay within a current paradigm, or time to step outside it.
Conclusions: Truth, Method, and Education
We began our discussion with the meaning of truth. At this point I believe we are ready to
once again address the issue. The pursuit of science has clearly not reached its end. The
stock of scientific knowledge continues to grow daily. This knowledge consists of
propositions about nature. No one would suggest that nature is ruled by our science -- the
propositions of science are held up against nature on a daily basis, and persist or perish
based on her judgment. Since the metaphysical question, the question of the existence of
absolute truth, need not concern us here, we will limit ourselves to the simple question: do
we encourage our students to consider the propositions of science as such, or to view
them as the very rules that Nature consults on a daily basis to determine her action.
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Hume's refutation of induction is conclusive. That a thing in nature may follow a
particular course one thousand times cannot guarantee that it will do so on the one
thousand and first trial. Yet this does not take away from the explanatory power of our
scientific hypotheses. If science progresses, as Popper believes, through a process of
conjecture and refutation, moreover, if scientific theories are good theories in so far as
they are testable, then clearly a dogmatic attitude towards the propositions of science can
only hinder its advancement.
This idea is unsettling because we like to look at ourselves as the end of history. A little
modesty should immediately inform us that we are as prone to error as our forefathers.
Our task, as Popper would say, is not to lay claim to the truth, but to eliminate error as
quickly as possible. Achievement of this task hinges on our retaining a critical attitude.
The previous chapters have presented an argument in favor of a number of propositions.
In the first place, we are not passive mirrors of reality, but actively construct our
knowledge of the world. Secondly, our survival depends on action in the face of the
unknown, consequently, we have evolved into a species that continually generates
hypotheses and acts accordingly. We are not unaware of the results of our actions, and
unexpected results inspire us to generate further hypotheses. This chapter considered the
advance of scientific knowledge. Science, too, progresses through a process of hypothesis
generation in the face of the unknown. These hypotheses are acted upon -- that is, we
conduct experiments -- and new hypotheses are generated in the face of the novelty thus
released. The further progress of science depends upon our ability to abandon a scientific
theory when its explanatory powers have been exhausted and it is obviously contradicted
by the facts (see Kuhn, Structure, for a discussion on the scientist's reluctance to abandon
the current paradigm -- indeed, typically a whole generation of scientists must pass away
before an inadequate theory is abandoned). This demands the strength to adopt a critical
attitude towards the current paradigm when necessary.
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The implications of this for education are clear, and are addressed more fully in the
following chapter. Scientific education through a process of conjecture and refutation may
not only provide a more appropriate method of teaching than the methods currently
employed, it may also engender the kind of critical attitude required of a good scientist --
an attitude which will not shrink, when it is time, from discarding a theory, regardless of
how beloved it is, when its usefulness has reached an end.
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Computers and Education
Knowledge Building
In chapter one we introduced the problem of epistemology, and considered three of the
most influential theories in the field, viz. the theories of John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and
Jean Piaget. Locke's theory holds that all knowledge comes from the relation of ideas, and
that the ultimate source of all ideas is experience. Essentially, for Locke, our knowledge is
a true mirror of the external world, and moreover the reflection is passive. Kant's position
is diametrically opposed to Locke's. He separates the world as a thing-in-itself from our
experience of it and maintains that we only have access to our experience. Our experience,
he says, is the result of the active ordering of the mind. This ordering process follows rules
that are given a priori, that is, independent of experience. Thus the nature and form of all
knowledge is determined from within, according to principles of organization which are
wholly independent of experience.
After considering these early epistemologies, we examined the work of Jean Piaget.
During his study of the cognitive development of children, Piaget recognized that
knowledge emerges as a result of two processes -- assimilation of new objects (problems
etc.) to existing knowledge structures, and accommodation of these knowledge structures
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to the new object. New knowledge comes from the interaction of the subject and the
object. Consequently it is midway between the theories of Locke and Kant. To Locke,
Piaget would say that new experiences are considered in the light of what is already
known, and if possible the new experience is assimilated to the existing body of
knowledge. To Kant, Piaget would reply that while the subject actively orders experience,
this ordering activity is altered by, or accommodated to, the experience. Consequently the
ordering process is not given a priori.
Another idea culled from Piaget's theory is that new knowledge is generated through the
application of a behavior to a novel object. As Peterson has pointed out, when faced with
a novel situation, an organism must react, even though the nature of that action may not
yet be determined. The new situation must be explored. In early childhood, a child
explores new objects by applying actions that have proved appropriate to other objects. If
the action allows for successful manipulation of the object, the new object is assimilated to
the action and the action is accommodated as necessary. This is the prototype of typical
exploratory behavior -- conjecturing that a particular action will be appropriate for
handling an object -- and testing this conjecture. Error is eliminated from the conjecture by
refining the action to the new object, or rejecting the conjecture that the action is
appropriate.
Hypothesis Generation
Since action in novel situations is, in the worse case, necessary for survival, and action
cannot be determined without a leading idea, humans have a natural predisposition to
generate hypotheses. In chapter two we examined this tendency over three different
domains. In the first we considered the opinions of archaic man. Here we discovered that
primitive man seeks a causal explanation for everything. This tendency is so pronounced
that chance events are impossible for him. He will believe that an unusual event is the
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result of the workings of magic before he will admit the possibility of chance. If he is
deprived of a definite cause that he can understand, then he is deprived of the possibility of
taking action. Consequently his disbelief in the possibility of chance events may constitute
a manifestation of his strong inclination to provide a working hypothesis whenever the
unusual occurs. Perhaps this habit is so pronounced because of the hazardous nature of his
environment.
The need for a definite explanation also shows itself in the workings of the shaman, or
medicine man of a tribe. Aside from being a religious leader, he provides definite causal
explanations for illnesses and death. His purpose is to provide working hypotheses, which
may seem outlandish to us, and to our mind must seem as such to the shaman. Yet to the
people of his tribe, he provides definite answers to seemingly inexplicable events. This
reduces the anxiety inherent in the unknown. They may act on this answer. Their actions
may be ineffective -- but they may act.
The same propensity to hypothesis generation can be seen in the early days of scientific
discovery in Renaissance Europe. The alchemists explained the chemical reactions they
observed in terms of religious ideas and religious symbolism. Their imagination suggested
to them that a tremendous prize awaited them at the end of their research. They were
driven by the hope that they were struggling towards the possibility of generating the
perfect substance, or creating an elixir capable of any manner of transformation. Seen from
the perspective of the alchemists, neither of these possibilities can be called absurd. They
used occult ideas, because these ideas allowed them to begin to explain what they
witnessed in their laboratories. While the more glamorous results were never obtained, we
have seen that the pursuit of alchemy provided enough useful errors to guide Robert Boyle
to found modern chemisry, and Isaac Newton to found modern physics.
Whether or not one considers these so-called useful errors as having helped or hindered
the scientific endeavor, there is one result that we cannot deny. When faced with the
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unknown, these early scientists did not simply throw up their hands and cry "another black
box mystery." They actively explored the unknown with their imagination, and in so
doing, made conjectures about the nature of the transformations they witnessed. These
conjectures could be tested, and if the alchemist was lucky, the conjecture might help him
unearth new evidence. Evidence that may lead him or others to either reject the conjecture
or to continue to build upon it. According to Popper and Kuhn, modern science continues
to grow in such a fashion.
The final area examined in chapter two is the reaction of modern children to conundrums
of experience. Like archaic man, the child endows the objects in his environment with
consciousness and life. Occurrence in nature can be explained by endowing the objects in
nature with intention. It seems that intentional action does not pose a problem to the child,
not at least until it becomes a philosopher. To him, all his actions seem to be due to his
own volition. He uses similar ideas to explain other occurrences. When faced with a
difficult question the child will guess at an answer -- he will make a conjecture. For
example, if he is shown a metal box hung from a wound up double string and asked why,
when the box is released, it will turn, the child may answer that the box turns because it is
attached to a string that feels itself to be wound up and wishes to unwind itself. Instead of
remaining in the dark, the child will suggest an answer. Instead of an explanation in terms
of tension and Newton's laws -- the child simply endows the string with intention, and
explains that the string, feeling itself to be wound up, simply wishes to unwind itself.
Two implications follow from these observations. First, the natural course of learning may
be an active process of hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing. This follows in a line
from Piaget's conception of the building of knowledge structures through a process of
assimilation: hypothesis generation -- perhaps behavior x is appropriate for circumstance
y; and accommodation: hypothesis testing -- behavior x is not appropriate for
circumstance y or aspects a and b of behavior x are not appropriate for circumstance y,
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but aspects c and d are. If this is the case then attempts to educate through the more
traditional, top-down presentation of facts, theories, and opinions, is likely to prove less
than optimal.
There is another implication of this propensity to hypothesis generation. When a student
approaches a novel problem domain, he does not do so as a passive tabula rasa, but rather
as an active explorer, and moreover, an explorer with a history. This means that the
student may bring any number of prejudices to bear on the new problem. These are the
initial attempts at creating working hypotheses. They may be drawn from analogies with
other problem domains, or may simply be guesses which are initially more or less useful.
Since these initial hypotheses are generated under less than perfect conditions, it is very
unlikely that they will amicably fit in with the new information. Typically they clash, and
this leads to error, and/or the situation familiar to all educators whereby the student simply
cannot begin to grasp the matter of the lesson.
Since learning may be such a process of assimilation and accommodation, the ideal
approach may be to allow the student to approach the problem as Piaget believed a child
approaches a physical problem. First, there is an initial attempt at assimilation. Previously
established behaviors are applied to the new problem as a first pass at classification. The
student learns that behaviors a, b, and c are not effective, but after accommodating
behavior d, it becomes capable of effective manipulation of the object. This has the
advantage that the obviously incorrect behaviors a, b, and c, are weeded out and will not
interfere at a later stage simply because they have not yet been explicitly addressed.
Behavior d, as the most appropriate behavior, will serve as an initial starting point. It too
has been explicitly addressed, and consequently will not act as an invisible, but real,
impediment to further learning.
In other words, when a student is faced with a new problem, his natural reaction is to
attempt to solve this problem with ideas derived elsewhere. A number of ideas are brought
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to bear on the problem. After a brief period of experimentation, most of these ideas may
be explicitly disqualified as ineffectual. The remaining may prove useful, perhaps because
they allow a portion of the problem to be broken down, or perhaps because they serve as
useful analogies. It is likely that these ideas will be transformed in the process, or perhaps
new ideas will be generated through the combination of more primitive ideas. In any case,
they act as a starting part, and will aid the learning process according to how directly they
lead to a more correct position, or hinder it according to how much they mislead the
student. In the former case, ideally the process should be capitalized upon. In the latter,
the problem of the misleading ideas must be addressed. Either way, explicit knowledge of
the leading idea will prove expedient to the learning process as a whole.
The Scientific Method
In the chapter on scientific methodology, we discussed the growth of scientific knowledge.
Specifically we considered Karl Popper's views on the growth of science. Besides this, we
reviewed the progress of science under the rubric of a particular paradigm and the
dependence of observations on the theory under which the observations are made.
The value of this discussion is three-fold. Firstly, The views of Popper and Kuhn add
further weight to the arguments in favor of the proposition that humans naturally generate
a hypothesis and act in a manner consistent with the hypothesis. When the hypothesis
proves itself to be inadequate, it is replaced by a new one. In its more extreme form, such
a paradigm shift constitutes a scientific revolution. At the more day to day level, this
behavior finds expression in experimental work.
Secondly, the scientific method may provide a model for education. Typically education is
a presentation of facts that are presented in the classroom in a top down format. In the
best case, the students grapple with the information as it is presented to them and continue
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to do so until they have made the ideas their own. In the worst case the information is
simply repeated until it seems to stick. The disadvantages of the latter are obvious, and
have already been discussed at greater length. Instead of attaining a comfortable
understanding of the ideas, they remain foreign to the student. In such cases the student is
reduced to pattern matching. While he still functions according to hypothesis generation
and testing, the hypotheses themselves are not directly related to the problem material.
They concern formal aspects of the problem. If there are sufficient cues, a prescribed
solution method will be applied to the problem. If this hypothesis fails, another prescribed
solution method may recommend itself. Learning based on purely formal pattern matching
is clearly not the highest goal of education.
The methods of science suggest an alternative approach to learning. If the student
approached a new problem domain as an active explorer and experimenter, he may achieve
two advantages over more traditional methods. First, his initial prejudices would be
eliminated at the early stages. Since these prejudices would form the basis for his initial set
of hypotheses, they would be ruled out in so far as they failed to produce correct results.
Second, knowledge gained in this way would have a firmer basis. The reason for this is, if
the process of learning is hypothesis generation and testing, all hypothesis would come
from the subject, and as such they would already be related to the subjects current
knowledge structures. The subject's knowledge structures would be accommodated until
the new problem has become assimilated. It would no longer be necessary for the student
to commit formal patterns to memory by rote, since knowledge structures pertaining to
the material itself would have been actively constructed.
The third implication of the discussion of the methods of science for education concerns
the education of our scientists. If science does in fact progress according to a process of
conjecture and refutation, the advantage of using that method in education is clear. While
studying the theory behind a science, the students receive implicit training in method.
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Scientists thus trained may acquire critical experimental skills of no small stature. The
possibilities are as yet unexplored.
Computers and Learning
The procedure recommended in this thesis is one which allows the student actively explore
the material of a new problem domain. However, most educational institutions have
neither the time nor the money to allow students to explore even modest experimental
methods. Both equipment and expertise are lacking. Advances in computer technology,
however, allow for the possibility of moving the laboratory from the physical to the so-
called virtual realm.
For some time now researchers have been using simulation methods to explore the
possibilities in a particular problem domain. Typically this is done when the problem is too
complex for the researcher to rely solely on his intellectual powers. Once the problem is
modeled in the computer, the researcher can quickly and easily conduct experiments. By
simply changing the value of an input or a parameter he can observe how the
computerized model reacts, and make probabilistic inferences on how the actual system
may react under similar conditions. The intuitive insights that an experimenter may derive
from exploring a computerized model are considerable. Because of the insights which may
be derived from using simulation programs, these programs are finding their way into
classrooms where they are used for demonstrative purposes. This is becoming more
popular across academic and industrial disciplines.
In a simulation, the theory of the problem domain is captured in the program. This
programmed theory provides the constraints for the system. Once the constraints are in
place, the user may experiment with the virtual system. The user can generate a
hypothesis, and design an experiment to test it. If the experiment initially works, the result
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may suggest new hypotheses to the student. If the experiment fails, the hypothesis may be
discarded in favor of a new one, or it may be modified and tested again. Learning could
potentially be converted into a process of exploration and discovery -- a process which
can be extremely rewarding.
Limitations
We round off our discussion by briefly considering the limitations of the ideas suggested
here. In the first place, many of the ideas were explored in the context of scientific
education. The applicability of these ideas to the domains of physics, engineering, and
chemistry are relatively obvious, but it is not so clear how these ideas may be useful in
teaching such subjects as history for example, or literature. The possibilities would have to
be explored at greater length.
Civilization has amassed a huge volume of information. Practical considerations suggest
that allowing the student to discover it all anew is infeasible. A mixture of methods of
active exploration and top-down presentation of information seems to be the most
reasonable initial approach. Other aspects of classroom experience should not be left out
of consideration. It is not the intention of the author to suggest that all traditional methods
of teaching should be abandoned in favor of experimentation in a virtual laboratory.
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The current thesis represents an initial attempt to explore the implications of learning
through interaction -- through hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing.
In the first place, many of the ideas themselves should be subjected to severe criticism at
the theoretical level. The work of more modern cognitive scientists was left largely
unexplored by the author. Modern memory theory was also left out of the issue. It is
currently believed that humans may possess up to five distinct memory systems: primary,
perceptual, procedural, episodic, and semantic (See Memory Systems 1994, Schacter and
Tulving, MIT Press, 1994). A further theoretical issue that was hinted at in chapter two is
the potential role of imagination in learning and research. Many acknowledge the
tremendous value of imagination in research, yet few seem as willing to devote effort to
the development of this faculty of the human mind. Most educators are far more
concerned with training the semantic memory system to store pre-formed hypotheses than
training the imagination (episodic memory system? -- see Peterson's Gods of War) to
reconstruct hypotheses or generate them anew.
The discussion specific to computer use was not sufficiently representative. Perhaps the
title of the thesis should be changed to Learning through Interaction: A Preliminary
Study for a Potential Role for Computers in Education. Once the cognitive aspects of this
issue have been further explored, a more detailed examination of the potential role of
computers in education should be pursued. Technology continues to race forward, yet our
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methods of education have hardly changed at all over the last one hundred years. It is time
to reevaluate our methods in the light of this exploding technological advance.
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